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Abstract
Numerous references found in the academic and trade literature discuss the availability and applicability of certain
technologies and policies to allow the U.S. electrical grid
to address the future challenges of continued growth and
aging infrastructure. However, the existing utility companies seem reluctant to adopt these new measures. This thesis will describe some of these strategies and develop a
model using Stella system dynamics software that will explore the potential financial impact to the utilities from
using these strategies in combination. The four strategies
to be investigated are feed in tariffs, time of use rates,
distributed generation, and demand-side energy efficiency .

There are other strategies that could be considered such as
Renewable Portfolio Standards, Net Metering, Critical Peak
Pricing, and Renewable Energy Tax Credits. These other
strategies are either similar in implementation to the four
discussed in this paper or have been shown to not have
lasting affect on the utility industry's bottom line. For
this reason, the four listed above have been chosen.

ix

From the research and the test case data used in this paper, the following findings were observed:

• Distributed Generation will most likely not be implemented
without some true incentive to the owner and without a
policy such as Feed-In Tariffs.
• Energy Efficiency practices can significantly reduce electrical consumption. Specific technologies have very attractive payback or return on investment and others are
not practical when only taking into account ROI measurements.
• Peak Shifting or Peak shaving can have significant effect
on the utility's profit but has no effect on the consumer's electricity bill.
• Time of Use rates have very different effects on the utility. Depending upon the cost structure of their generation
and the nature of its customer load, the TOU rate can significantly reduce the profit of the utility even without
Peak Shifting.
• The biggest positive impact for society as a whole would
be a policy that lowers electrical consumption, decreases
the release of greenhouse gases, and allows the utility to
remain a viable business. The combination of strategies

x

that offers this impact would be the use of Peak Shifting
with no TOU rates, demand-side Energy Efficiency, and the
implementation of a FIT for photovoltaic generation.

xi

Introduction
The purpose of this thesis is to describe and simulate the
effects of the four strategies of feed-in tariffs, time-ofuse rates, distributed generation, and energy efficiency on
the Harrisonburg Electric Commission (HEC), a municipallyowned distributor of electricity. The goal is to determine
the effects of these policies on HEC profits, its customers' electric bills, and the total residential consumption
of electricity within HEC's service area. The principles
and functionality used in this model can serve as a template for application to other regions of the United States
and other electricity distributors.

HEC is a relatively small electricity distributor with
loads ranging from about 55 MW up to 130 MW. In comparison,
a large coal-fired generating plant can generate well over
400 MW. HEC's customer base of about 20,000 accounts is
made up of industrial, commercial users as well as approximately 17,000 residential customer. It was formed in 1957
as a way to consolidate smaller generating plants and provide wholesale buying power to the local Harrisonburg area.
Because of their size, HEC purchases over 99% of its power
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from larger, regional utilities under a multi-year contract.

Energy versus Electricity
Throughout the literature the terms 'energy' and 'electricity' are used interchangeably. Both terms are used numerous
times throughout this paper. For this paper, because the
discussions of electricity are entwined in discussions of
energy in general, the term electricity represents a subset
of the term energy and is not considered interchangeable.
All efforts are made to keep this usage consistent in regards to citations in the literature and in this author's
discussions.

A Brief History
The United States has built a complex yet impressive infrastructure for its electrical demands since the early 20th
century. Vertically integrated utilities were able to grow
virtually unimpeded in the first 25 years of the 1900's. As
generating plants became larger and more efficient, more
industrial generators (non-utilities) gave up their smaller
generating capacity because it was economically beneficial
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and more convenient. Smaller utilities merged with larger
to increase their territory. The utilities were handed
near-monopolistic control over ever growing transmission
networks. As these territories grew past state lines, the
federal government began to exercise its authority. In the
1930's and 1940's, the federal government passed new laws
regulating investor-owned utilities, pressed for broader
electrification in the U.S., and began several large hydroelectric projects that put the government in the power
business. Demand for electricity grew every year, even during the Great Depression. Prices steadily dropped and despite new government oversight, the utility industry continued to grow.

Until the late 1960's, demand continued to grow and prices
dropped by achieving economies of scale through growing capacity. By then, market saturation was high and utilities
began to see costs rise as growth slowed and the economies
of scale leveled off. Large projects cost more due to the
rise of inflation, pollution control requirements from the
newly formed EPA, and higher input costs from the energy
price shocks in 1973 and 1979. New generating plants already under construction began to come online. For the
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first time in 70 years, capacity margin (the difference between capacity to generate and actual generation) began to
balloon. In 1982, actual generation or total consumption
actually shrank for the first time since 1945. Economic
slowdown and savings due to increased efficiency in electricity use contributed to this drop in consumption. As a
result, the utility industry put the brakes on capacity expansion and began to idle some plants. However, demand
growth recovered quickly and capacity margin began to
shrink again because utilities did not reinstate their
planning processes[1]. Not until the early 2000's did the
capacity margin begin to grow again[2] due to an increase in
smaller and more nimble gas generators. Also, capacity increases resulted from new producers entering the market as
new regulation enticed or even forced vertically integrated
utilities to de-couple their generation capabilities from
their retail distribution and other business services. This
de-coupling allowed the new non-utilities to compete in the
electricity markets. Summer capacity margin, a significant
measure of reliability, has remained mostly between 15% and
20 % each year since 2004 after falling for the previous
15-20 years.

5

Figure 1 - Historical and Projected Trends for Generation
Capacity in the U.S. The upper graph shows three trends;
the amount of capacity that is still operating graphed vs
installed year, the amount of non-operating, retired capacity vs retirement year, and the projected coal-fired, retired, coal-fired capacity vs retirement year if all coalfired plants operate for 60 years. The lower graph shows
the total or accumulated capacity in operation until 2008
and the effects on capacity of retiring the coal-fired
plants as they reach age 60.

The Current Situation
On the supply side of the electricity equation, the question remains whether the continued growth in demand can be
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met. The utility industry faces an aging infrastructure,
higher construction costs, longer delays for permitting new
plants, and an unknown future with regards to government
policy and demand growth. Many in the industry and academia
acknowledge that the existing infrastructure consisting of
large scale generating plants and transmission and distribution lines is aging and fraying under the steady growth
of electrical demand with few realistic plans for upgrades
and improvements[3-5]. For example, even if utilities were to
operate all of their coal-fired power plants to the age of
60 (twice their normal accounting life), 94% of them would
be retired by 2050. Since coal-fired plants provide more
than 30% of the nation's electricity, the loss of these
units will leave a large gap in the national capacity. The
lower graph of Figure 1 (above) shows what the installed
capacity might look like under this scenario. Summer capacity margin would reach critical levels if large amounts of
new generation are not installed in the next 15-20 years.
Addressing this one issue will be a daunting and expensive
task[6]. The aging U.S. electrical grid is becoming less reliable due to these problems of continued growth and very
little new capacity[7;

8].
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The question is whether the electric power industry can remain profitable while maintaining and improving the required infrastructure. Undertaking new plant construction
in the large, centralized style of the past requires utilities to apply to the regulators for the ability to pass the
new costs on to the customers. Most rate structures for
electricity distributors are based upon the value of their
installed assets such as generating plants and transmission
and distribution systems. In the 1980's, in order for the
utilities to include new plants in their asset base, the
regulators applied the standard known as 'used and useful'.
The implication was that the new plant had to have a higher
economic value than its true accounting cost. This standard
was used to keep utilities from building unnecessary plants
just to increase their asset base in times of electricity
supply surplus. This strict standard made it difficult for
utilities to add new capacity. One effect of this standard
was to contribute to the continued decline in new plant
construction as indicated above in the upper graph of Figure 1[9]. Other contributors to the dearth of construction
were the long term uncertainties of the electricity markets, policy changes that came with constantly changing administrations at the federal and state level, and higher
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borrowing costs that resulted from investors being unsure
about the quality of the investment[10].

From the 1920's until the 1990's, electricity was treated
as a commodity by utilities, consumers, and policymakers[11].
It did not matter where the electricity came from as long
as it was cheap and available at the flip of a switch. In
1970, the fraction of U.S. total energy use that was electricity was 25%. By 2007, it was 40%[12]. This trend is expected to continue due to the continuing transformation of
the U.S. economy from heavy industry to more serviceoriented businesses. One indicator of this commodity viewpoint is what Polimeni calls the Economic Energy Intensity
(EEI) index. The EEI is the ratio of total energy consumption to the Gross Domestic Product or the amount of energy
required to produce a dollar's worth of goods[13].

This in-

dex has shown a 50% decrease from 1949 to 2004 resulting
from the reduced value of energy inputs in the economy. Energy inputs became cheaper because of more efficient production methods and more competition from world-wide producers of oil and coal. Figure 2 (below) shows the trend of
the EEI with what U.S. Department of Energy labels E/GDP.
However, the Total Energy Consumption (TEC) counteracts the
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point by having tripled in the same time span

[13; 14].

This

trend is indicated in Figure 2 by the line labeled Energy.
The TEC measures the total of all energy consumption. If
the TEC continues to climb then the GDP must climb even
faster to produce the downward trend of the EEI. During the
period from 1949 to 2004, the graph indicates the nation's
GDP has grown by a factor of eight thus making EEI lower
over time. Just as with any commodity, the U.S. has become
less concerned about the source of the energy it consumes
as the energy becomes less economically significant as indicated by the EEI downward trend.

Figure 2- Historical Trends for Energy Consumption, GDP,
and Intensity This graph, produced by the Department of En-
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ergy, shows trends in total energy consumption (labeled Energy), GDP, and the normal Economic Energy Index (E/GDP).
The graph's declining Intensity Index indicates energy efficiency improvements over the time span

[13].

During the 1990's, new concerns about our energy use arose
from two basic issues. The first concern was the continued
instability in the price and access to our energy inputs.
Because of society's dependence on fossil fuels, geopolitical turmoil and threat of supply shortage created insecurity in the U.S. Rapid growth of the so-called BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) increased the
global demand for oil and other fossil fuels. Since fossil
fuels are still used to generate over 69% of the electricity in the U.S., the global fossil fuel economy is central
to much of our foreign policy today.

The second concern about U.S. energy consumption was the
growing body of evidence suggesting an increased anthropogenic effect on the earth's climate from fossil fuel use.
As more research was produced, the concern continued to
grow which has lead to global efforts to mitigate the further burning of fossil fuels and the resulting greenhouse
gases (GHG). Again, geopolitical issues are at the fore-
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front of the climate change concerns because of the BRIC
growth in demand but here in the U.S. there is little political will to address the problems in any meaningful way.
Global initiatives make little difference in how we use energy. Legislation is proposed but never passed. Groups of
Americans speak out but are never heeded. New technologies
will be necessary to reduce the amount of GHG emissions
into the atmosphere. Many climate models show that large
reductions will be needed to slow the increase of CO2 to
levels that even the conservative predictions say we need.
How can this concern be addressed?

The Path Forward
In the past, the U.S. energy policy was simple; provide
cheap electricity to as many people as possible and let it
serve as the lifeblood of a growing economy. Now, with
these new concerns, our energy policy must address three
strategic goals: energy must be cheap, secure, and clean[15].

Policy Goal: Cheap Energy
The United States still needs a source of cheap energy to
feed its demand. The projected electricity demand growth
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rate is more than 1% every year for the next 28 years[3].
Electricity will continue represent between 40% and 50% of
the total energy consumption in the U.S. over the same time
period.

Policy Goal: Secure Energy
As a result of turmoil in oil-exporting countries in the
Middle East and Africa and natural disasters such as the
2010 oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico, the U.S. is heavily
dependent on energy sources that it cannot completely control. These factors relating to security will continue to
add a price to the cost of our cheap energy.

Policy Goal: Clean Energy
Societies have always increased their desire for a healthy
life as affluence increased. An example of this desire was
the transition from steam locomotives to diesel locomotives
because they were cleaner and allowed traveling to be more
enjoyable and our cities to be less sooty. Another example
is the demand for cleaner places to live which drove the
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migration from the cities to the suburbs in decades past
[15].

Since the 1970's, America has become increasingly aware

of the societal costs of pollution to our air and water.
Now, with the increasing concern over the effects of climate change, the clean requirement has taken on new meaning. There is more desire to limit the burning of fossil
fuels to generate electricity or to do other things that
could be done in a cleaner way with electricity.

Market Based Approach
For the past 35 years, our government chose to deal with
these policy concerns with privatization, liberalization,
and competition. Beginning with Public Utility Regulatory
Policies Act (PURPA) in 1978 and following with other major
legislation like the Energy Policy Act of 1992, the federal
government attempted to unlock the electric utility monopolies and push new technology into the marketplace. The idea
was that the electric utility industry needed to be opened
to competition and allow market-based reforms to take hold.
This approach presupposes that investment in new technology
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or capacity will occur when the investments can be driven
by potential profits and the competition for them.

There are a number of problems with this policy. Electricity cannot be stored until the market chooses to pay the
required price. Therefore there must be excess generating
capacity because there is no 'inventory' to draw from in
times of shortage. This problem requires the utilities to
have different types of capacity online, ready to produce.
The nature of these quick-response generators or 'peak
load' producers is that they are more expensive to operate.
To pay for the peak load producers, the regulators must allow the utilities to pass these costs through to their customers or risk not having them built. The risk is measured
in the difference between supply and demand side perceptions. The cost of electricity shortages to the utility is
simply the loss of a sale. The cost to the customer might
be extremely high. If a factory relies on electricity to
run its process 24 hours per day, then losing that supply
could mean huge recovery costs from damage to the process
as well as lost sales. This lack of balance requires policy
intervention because the utilities risk much less than
their customers by failing to provide adequate supply dur-
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ing these peal loads. The regulators, not the markets, must
provide the balance between the supplier and customer.

Another problem with the existing policy, is that electricity requires a network (the electric grid) for distribution
which is considered a public necessity by all. Because most
utilities enjoy near-monopolistic power, this public need
is usually not managed in an equitable way and thus requires policy intervention. If one company owns a particular transmission line, then there needs to be some incentive or regulation that pushes the utility to allow access
to the transmission line by other companies that also generate electricity. This requirement is especially important
with generation such as wind turbines that have a regional
propensity. In order for the electricity to get to the enduser, it must be transmitted a long distance over wires
that the generating company might not own.

Lastly, the marginal price (the incremental cost to produce
one additional unit of something) of oil is much lower than
the actual OPEC-driven price of oil. In other words, the
cost to produce an additional barrel of oil after the well
is in place is much less than the price set by the OPEC or-
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ganization. This price distortion in the market also affects the cost of natural gas and coal. This effect is
caused by the world economy constantly balancing the cost
of a BTU, a basic unit of energy. The market value for a
BTU is the same

independent of its source in the short

term. The source could be coal, oil, gas, as well as other
possibilities such as nuclear or even solar thermal in some
cases[16]. These distortions make it difficult for utilities
to project costs into the future. Contracts to purchase energy have become hedges against possible price shocks which
allows speculators and other non-energy industries to affect the price of energy.

In summary, the traditional market driven policies for
electricity have not allowed the balancing between supply
and demand necessary to address the three goals of cheap,
secure, and clean electricity. The investment that is necessary to make these policies work is too risky to investors. Unknown growth in demand, unpredictable energy
prices, and the regional monopolies of the existing utilities create a business environment in which few companies
want to compete. While the demand is projected to continue
to grow well into the 21st century under most model scenar-
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ios, the existing utilities have little motivation to adapt
to the new challenges.

Other Approaches
If the three drivers of our energy policy are indeed occurring then somehow investments will have to be made in the
system to address them. If the liberalized markets are unable to drive this investment then the utility industry is
in need of more change. Other sources of electricity and
new technologies will be necessary to have a reliable system in the future. To address the need for clean electricity, new technology such as Carbon Capture and Sequestration (CCS), clean coal methods, and renewable energy
sources will all have to be part of the portfolio. Unfortunately there is no historical basis for us being able to
find a quick fix. There is no one clear goal to accomplish
and there are not seemingly unlimited funds available for
another Apollo or Manhattan Project[15]. Unfortunately, as
described above, the United States will not be able to make
the necessary changes through market-based policies alone.
The rural areas did not have access to electricity in the
past until the federal and state governments provided incentive for the utilities to do so. Large hydroelectric
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projects would not have been undertaken by investor-owned
utilities. The federal government had to step in with
funded initiatives such as the Tennessee Valley Authority
or the Hoover Dam. Similarly, the goal of providing cheap,
secure, and clean electricity will require a long term plan
and some incentive for the utilities to change. If history
serves as an example, the changes should include marketbased competition, consumer-based demands, and regulatory
coaxing to implement policies that truly address our need
for cheap, secure, and clean electricity into the future.

One possibility is for the utilities to change how they
conduct business. The historical business model of the
power utility industry has been that of a single-sided
platform with rigid government regulation. Single-sidedness
comes from there being a single producer at one end and a
buyer at the other[17]. The producer does not buy and the
buyer does not sell. To minimize monopolistic issues with
this model, a public utility commission or a similar governing body is used to set profitability for the utilities.

There are other methods for addressing the new energy policy goals of the U.S and without ignoring the aging utility
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infrastructure and the trials of industry de-regulation
over the last 20 years[18]. To many in government and the
utility industry, de-regulation (more market-based reforms)
is still seen as the best method for making progress and
fomenting change in the electric utility industry. Still
others believe that through the use of known and tested
concepts such as feed-in-tariffs, distributed generation,
time of use rates, and improved consumption efficiency, the
power utility industry could begin to adopt a more diverse,
multi-sided platform model[19;

20].

The multi-sidedness comes

from all parties connected to the electrical grid being
able to participate in buying and selling electricity. Even
consumers would be allowed to generate their own electricity and sell excess power to the grid[21]. Could the utilities adopt this multi-sidedness through the use of these
concepts? Does this make economic sense for the utilities?
This paper will discuss this question.

Regulatory issues are always a part of any utility discussion. If utility companies are to change the way they conduct business, regulatory bodies will have to approve
changes in billing practices and rate structures. Public
Utility Commissions or Public Service Commissions are usu-
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ally the government bodies that oversee the near-monopolies
of the investor-owned utilities. In a simplified form, if
regulatory bodies are functioning properly, they act as a
check on the profits of utility companies and protect the
consumers' interest in maintaining quality infrastructure.
Regulatory bodies, or in the case of this paper, the State
Corporation Commission (SCC) of Virginia, review the rates
and profits of the utility companies they oversee. If the
profits are deemed too high then rates are adjusted downward and if the utilities are not generating the appropriate revenues to pay for their asset bases and operating
costs then rates or other adjustments can be made upward.

The Purpose of this Thesis
This thesis will present a tool that can evaluate the costs
and benefits from feed-in-tariffs, distributed generation,
time of use rates, and improved efficiency for Harrisonburg
Electric Commission. This tool is designed so that it might
be used by stakeholders such as utility executives or regulatory bodies to investigate the implementation of combinations of these strategies. Homeowners will also benefit indirectly from this analysis because the model will either
validate or disprove the strategies individually and in
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combination. All of these stakeholders will need to play a
part in future changes to the electrical infrastructure so
the model must be able to show benefit for all groups to
elicit their participation. It is hoped that by combining
feed-in-tariffs, distributed generation, time of use rates,
and improved efficiency at the consumer level, the utility
industry can adjust its profit structure away from the historical one-sided, 'sell as much as you can' model, homeowners can lower their consumption, and the regulatory bodies will be able to explore how to change regulation in order to capture these benefits. The simulation tool is a
starting point for this analysis by the stakeholders.

There is a great deal of literature available on the individual concepts[19;

20; 22-24].

There has even been discussion

over the last 5-10 years about the systems approach of combining these strategies in a comprehensive strategy[18]. This
thesis describes this systems approach and develops a system dynamics model to simulate and demonstrate the interaction among implementations of these concepts and show how
utility businesses can help lower the consumption of electricity by their customers and still remain profitable. Although one of the benefits of the actual implementation of
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these policies is to increase electrical grid resiliency,
it is not the goal of this thesis to demonstrate it. The
scope is strictly limited to the financial impact of the
proposed policies or strategies.

This model could be used to evaluate the economic benefit
of businesses, individuals, or other entities producing
their own power and selling any excess to the utility. Using these scenarios, the utilities could be in the position
of acting as clearing houses for the electricity sales between these producers and consumers (a process known as
wheeling) and provide system infrastructure and oversight
for the exchange. The utilities could offer the new products and services to the consumer to allow for reduced consumption by giving homeowners better control over consumption. These strategies might lower the utilities' operating
costs by slowing new capacity requirements, reducing peak
demand loads and their associated costs, and reducing loads
on existing transmission and distribution infrastructure
thus lowering maintenance costs and providing a more reliable grid . From these changes, it could be possible for
the utilities to help reduce consumption but share in the
resulting reduced costs[18;

25].

Load swings could be better
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managed and excess baseload or non-peak capacity can be
better utilized during off-peak times[19]. These changes
could also lower the growing burden on the aging transmission infrastructure by distributing generation closer to
the end user.

This model and paper focuses on one particular region of
the United States. The localized boundary condition makes
the model easier to implement in regards to annual climate
and its direct effect on electricity costs and also the
generation capabilities and costs of the electricity distributor. Regulatory issues also affect power distributors
on a regional basis.

The region chosen is the service area of the Harrisonburg
Electrical Commission (HEC) which is a municipal electric
company in Harrisonburg, VA. HEC has limited generating capacity but still has a cost structure with baseload and
peak demand components. There are aspects to HEC's business
structure that limit the analysis of the combination of the
four strategies.
paper.

These issues are discussed later in this
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This model is built to be flexible enough to be adapted to
other regions of the country and to other utilities.
Through adjusting set-up parameters, most utility business
styles can be analyzed. Small municipal distributors, rural
cooperatives, and large regional utilities could be simulated using this model.

Only the residential customer class will be accounted for
in this model. Commercial and industrial customers have
load requirements and pricing factors that differ significantly from residential customers. To limit the complexity
of the discussion and model, these two categories will not
be included. The choice of residential loads is also based
upon the fact that it is currently the largest market sector with over 38% of the total electricity used, continues
to grow, and that more work needs to be done in this area
compared to the industrial and commercial segments[26]. The
model will use data provided by HEC but limited to the segment that relates to the residential customer class.

The regulatory structure has grown immensely complicated
over the years with the implementation of fuel cost recovery charges, regional transmission organization charges,
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and myriad other fees and mechanisms for bringing many
stakeholders to the bargaining table during rate cases. Because the purpose of this paper is to investigate new business strategies for a utility, the regulatory structure
will be included. However, the effects will be limited to
the profit checking efforts and will not include political
ramifications of changing the structure of the utility
business model. Hence, the case may be made from this paper
that utilities will have a profit motive to change the way
they conduct business so regulatory enforcement of new government policies might not be necessary.

Specific Research Questions
The goal of this thesis is to answer the following questions:

1. How might combinations of the strategies of Time of
Use pricing, Feed-In-Tariffs, Distributed Generation,
and Energy Efficiency affect HEC energy costs, consumer electric bills, and overall electrical consumption in the HEC residential class customer base?
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2. Which one of the strategy combinations from question
number 1 provides the best outcome for the profitability of the utility?
3. Which one of the strategy combinations from question
number 1 provides the best outcome for the saving of
the most energy?
4. What changes in the regulatory environment would improve the prospects for adopting these strategies?!

The Four Strategies
Just Four Policies
The four main policies that this thesis will investigate
are related to well known policies that have been implemented in the recent past. Many are still being used in
some form today. The four policies include:

1. Distributed Generation (DG)
2. Time of Use (TOU)
3. Feed-in-Tariff (FIT)
4. Energy Efficiency (EE)

To address the energy issues of cheap, secure, and clean
energy, there are certainly dozens of policies or strategies that might be used. For many years, the United States
and its citizens have debated the need to open more territories to oil, gas, and coal exploration. Nuclear power is
still a viable option. It is considered a greenhouse gas
(GHG) friendly source of electricity but it is debated
whether utilities can afford to implement it under the current regulatory requirements. However, more fossil fuels
and nuclear power do not address all three of the energy
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policy requirements of energy being cheap, secure, and
clean. They do represent business as usual in terms of
large-scale generation and delaying any significant changes
to the policies of the last 70 years.

Other possible strategies look to underdeveloped or untested technologies like clean coal processes, a hydrogen
powered devices, or producing cellulosic ethanol. Millions
of dollars are still being spent each year on fusion related research. All citizens would like to have the one
technology that addresses all of the energy requirements of
the nation. Historically, this has not occurred. Civilization knew of and used coal three thousand years ago but it
took the confluence of the steam engine, railroads, and the
scarcity of wood for Europe to convert to using mostly coal
in the 19th century. By 1900, coal still accounted for 93%
of the mineral fuels consumed in the U.S. Oil was still being used in its kerosene form but as more oil was discovered and the new demands of the gasoline engine for more
oil distillates grew, oil's portion of the total energy
consumption crept up[27]. Nuclear power appeared in the mix
in the 1950's after it was realized that nuclear fuels were
more abundant than previously understood. It has taken dec-
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ades if not centuries for every major energy source to develop and grow into a useful percentage of energy input.
Based upon this history, it is unlikely that a new technology is going to take a primary position in the next 10-20
years. We must consider known and tested sources and implementations that can fulfill the needs of the modern energy
policy.
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Distributed Generation
Definition
Distributed Generation (DG) is a concept that has been used
for decades but has not been truly defined or discussed as
a potential energy strategy until recently. In most cases,
the term ‘distributed generation’ is used in opposition to
the large-scale, centralized generating plant that are most
common in the industry. However, in Ackermann

[28],

the term

is shown to have different defining qualities. As stated
above, some suggest that the capacity of the DG defines it
as such. Placement of the DG's interconnection to the grid
might also define DG. In the literature, the following
characteristics of DG might be used to differentiate it
from traditional, centralized power generation.
1. the purpose of the generation;
2. the location of the DG;
3. the rating or capacity of the distributed generation;
4. the power delivery area;
5. the technology used to produce the electricity;
6. the environmental impact of the DG;
7. the mode of operation or how and by whom is the DG is
controlled ;
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8. the ownership of the generation;
9. the market penetration of distributed generation;

For the purposes of this paper, most of these characteristics are assumed. For example, for the model, the environmental impact of the DG will not be measured. However, from
the symbiosis between DG and FIT, the author assumes that
the impact will be minimal because it is FIT is usually defined as a renewable source but the model will not take
this into account. Corresponding to the list above and for
the purposes of this paper, the following assumptions are
made:

1. The purpose of the DG is provide additional generating
capacity to the grid. It will serve to correct power
factor or provide back-up capability.
2. The placement of the DG in the electrical system will
be downstream of the distribution transformers and
most likely on the customer's side of the meter.
3. The rating or capacity is not important as long as it
is known. Most DG is less than 10MW which is much
smaller than most utility-owned generation facilities.
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4. The delivery area is assumed to be HEC's delivery
area.
5. The generating technology is not important other than
it must be known so its marginal cost can correctly be
used.
6. The environmental impact is not implemented in the
model but is assumed to minimal because of the use of
renewable energy in most cases.
7. The mode of operation or who will control it will be
implicit in the model. The DG will be used when the
model calls for it.
8. The ownership is undeclared in the model. The cost of
implementation will be included but which stakeholder
actually pays the cost is the subject of future work.
9. The market penetration will be modeled in that as
penetration grows the beneficial effects will be monitored.

Distributed Generation: Implementation
Examples of distributed generation include photovoltaics(PV), wind turbine, and Combined-Heat and Power (CHP)
in its micro-turbine format. Typical PV systems on a resi-
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dential roof might vary between 1 kW and 20 kW. Single wind
turbines can range from less than 1 kW up to 7.5 MW found
in the latest, largest sizes. Gas turbines are used by
utilities today as their newest form of generation. Some
versions are used for quick acting generation for peak
loads. Recent developments of the shale gas fields throughout the U.S. have considerably lowered the cost of natural
gas. This fact has improved the cost benefit of gas-powered
turbines and CHP represents the most efficient form because
of its heat recovery capability. For the model, CHP microturbines of 65 kW or less are considered to be a possible
source of DG capacity. If used in conjunction with secondary heat capture, the thermal efficiency can reach over
80% which is much higher than traditional power plants
fired with coal or natural gas[22]. There are other possibilities for DG capacity. Fuel cells, small hydropower, and
biomass-fueled generation are all viable sources for distributed generation.

All of the above could be used in quantity to create a
large, centralized plant. There are wind farms that can
generate tens or even hundreds of MW of electricity. However, what makes these sources unique is their granularity.
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Most coal-fired plants, nuclear reactors, or gas turbines
are large scale projects that generate large quantities of
electricity in one location. The centralized plant requires
years of planning, permitting, and construction. A single
installation of PV or wind turbine can be designed, permitted, and installed in a few weeks. Instead of one 500MW
coal-fired plant, the plant could be replaced with 125,000
installations of PV on residential roof-tops.

Another unique characteristic of DG is the possibility of
multiple ownership. Instead of one company owning the electricity generation for thousands of homes and businesses,
there could be a combination of ownership across DG resources. Utilities could own and lease DG. Other businesses, small and large, could invest in DG and sell the
electricity to the utilities or directly to the consumer
through Power Purchase Agreements (PPA). Homeowners could
purchase DG systems, have them installed, use the electricity they need and then sell the excess back to the utility.
This characteristic enhances energy security.
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Distributed Generation: Pluses and Minuses
One of the largest advantages of DG is that it provides an
easy method for renewable energy sources to be installed.
The very nature of renewable energy is that while producing
electricity, there are no non-renewable energy inputs. Even
if these systems are less efficient technically, the lack
of wasted fossil fuels is significant. The diagram (Figure
3) shown

[29]

below does not show inefficiencies of individ-

ual sources of energy but it does show how much of the
Electricity Generation inputs are wasted as rejected energy. The total energy inputs for generation from all
sources in the United States in 2009 was estimated to be
38.19 quadrillion btus and the rejected portion was 26.10
quadrillion btus or over 68%. This indicates that our generation system on average has less than 32% thermal efficiency. Production level PV systems currently do not top
20% efficiency of energy output from energy input but because the energy source is sunlight, PV systems do not
waste non-renewable sources as do coal or natural gas.
Similarly, wind turbines use a renewable energy source input so there is no rejected energy component from wind in
the chart below. These sources of DG waste no fossil fuels
and produce no green house gases during operation.
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Figure 3- U.S. Energy Use, Sources and Consumption by Sector

Another benefit for using DG comes from generating electricity away from the traditional, large-scale, centralized
plants. Although this creates a more complex system, it
also creates a more resilient system for several reasons.
First is the fact that DG allows generating capacity to use
multiple fuel sources. By not picking a particular fuel as
a source for electrical generation, DG can absorb changes
to the supply and prices of these fuels. Second, if a central plant goes offline, this capacity must be replaced
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within seconds to minimize disruption to the grid. A central plant might generate enough electricity for over
100,000 homes and businesses. If a DG system, such as a
photovoltaic array on a homeowner’s roof, goes offline,
then only that home or group of homes near the DG resource
is threatened by disruption. Finally, the required reserve
capacity for the central plant is hundreds or thousands of
times larger than when using DG[18] As the number of segments
of a generating system increases, the risk of losing a certain percentage of capacity at any one time decreases[30].

For the utilities that have to build new capacity in the
future, there are economic benefits to DG. The centralized
plant takes longer to produce revenue than for DG of the
same capacity. The central plant requires investment further in advance of the plant actually producing power. That
same gain in capacity through DG will result in a return of
capital sooner because portions of the capacity will be
completed and come online earlier. This idea is illustrated

38
in Figure 4 below. This benefit can negate the current

Figure 4 - Use of Capital for Centralized Generation vs
Distributed Generation

[30]

The 'Modular Plant' represents

distributed generation and the 'Non-Modular Plant' represents the larger, centralized plant.

differences in the marginal cost of renewable sources and
coal or gas-fired plants. Also, because the extended timeline for the construction of a large plant, the utility
must plan for high enough capacity to allow for demand
growth before the next large plant is built. This results
in periods of idle capacity and periods of overcapacity
which cost money. This difference is shown in Figure 5 be-
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low. This figure shows the difference between the addition
of central sources of generation and where on the same
timeline, DG might be installed to achieve the same capacity.

Figure 5- Capacity Margin Effects for Distributed Generation vs Central Source

[31]

The last economic listed here relates to the investment
risk of central plants. Figure 5 shows the market dynamic
of installing capacity in chunks. The planning and forecasting for new capacity requires some idea of what the
electrical demand will be in the future. As that forecast
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becomes further and further into the future, the risk associated with the investment grows. In the past, utilities
have had to raise large sums of money through corporate
bonds in order to build new plants. The market judges the
viability of the project and the associated risk for the
utility by assigning an interest rate to the bond. As risk
goes up so does the cost of the bond because potential investors demand a higher return on their money. If the same
capacity were installed in steps then not only would each
investment be smaller than the large plant but its risk
would be judged separately. The risk should be smaller because the forecasting time window is shorter. Therefore,
the interest rates should be lower along with the cost to
the utility.

There is an inherent efficiency by using DG instead of central plants. Because DG is closer to the actual point of
consumption there are less losses due to transmission and
distribution (T&D) distances which are generally between 6%
and 7% of the total energy. If the DG is located on the
customer side of the meter, there are essentially no T&D
losses. Most forms of DG also have the ability to correct
for power factor issues. A perfect power factor is 1 and
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occurs when the phase of the AC current waveform and the
phase of the AC voltage waveform in a power transmission
are aligned. Power factor is the ratio of real power to the
apparent power of the circuit. Real power is the instantaneous power delivered while accounting for the phase difference. Apparent power is the same current and voltage but
at no phase difference. Power factor can become less than
one when inductive loads such as motors or capacitive loads
such as switching power supplies affect the power in the
circuit. Power factor becomes a problem for two reasons.
The first reason is that the grid must be sized for apparent power. If power factor becomes less than one then the
real power delivered becomes less than the apparent power
so the system must be oversized to accept this difference.
The second reason is that consumers pay for real power used
but the utilities must generate the apparent power. If
power factor is significantly less than 1 then the utility
must absorb the lost revenue.

DG allows for new technologies to be implemented in small
quantities which is the normal growth path of new ideas. DG
does not pick a winning technology like government subsi-
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dies or tax credits. It merely makes best use of it and allows the success or failure to be determined by the market.

There are two areas of concern for distributed generation.
Both are propagated by the utility industry but these two
areas need to be addressed for successful DG implementation. The first is the fact DG will require the utility to
either give up control over some of its capacity or find a
way to install and maintain thousands of DG sources
throughout their service area. Giving up control means reducing their sales and perhaps their profits. Installing
and maintaining the DG sources would require the utilities
to change the way they staff their companies. The expertise
required to keep the DG operational will be specialized and
most likely be a larger and more diverse group than utilities currently employ. This new requirement would be a fundamental change to the business model of the utilities of
today especially in an industry that is faced with the fact
that 500,000 energy industry workers will retire over the
next five to ten years. In 2006 Department of Energy report
titled "Workforce Trends in the Electric Utility Industry"[32] page 6, the DOE writes:
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From the early 1990s into the early 2000s, electric
power utilities experienced a general steady and overall
decline in workforce levels. That trend may have been
largely due to restructuring of the industry, which began in the early 1990s. The introduction of deregulation
created a competitive utility market prompting electric
utilities to downsize in an effort to reduce operating
costs.

Since 2000, the DOE found that[32] page 7:

The electric utility industry's employment level for
lineworkers has been steadily increasing. This hiring
trend is driven by utilities' anticipation of increased
demand, and is a response to the long periods of little
or no capital investment. Utilities, concerned with the
prospect of meeting the rising demand for energy using
the existing transmission lines, embarked upon a hiring
trend focused on employment to maintain, upgrade, and
expand the electric utility system.

How can the utility industry deal with the necessary
changes to begin implementing DG if it already has future
employment issues? Perhaps this can become an opportunity
for the utilities to remake themselves for this new paradigm.
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The second issue is the problem of 'power islanding'. When
the grid goes offline due to storm damage or equipment
failure then the distributed generation must disconnect
from the grid and then reconnect in a synchronized way when
the grid is restored. The purpose for the disconnect is to
protect the lineworkers from rogue power sources while
working to repair the damage. This problem is well known
and is being addressed by new standards that equipment
manufacturers and installers will have to follow. Although
this is a relatively new problem for the U.S., there are
thousands of DG installations throughout the world that
have addressed the concern.

These two concerns add to the requirements in order to successfully implement distributed generation but are not insurmountable. If the utilities have a profit motive to implement DG then many of the other hurdles will be overcome.
Hence, the model presented provides some basis for evaluating if such benefits to the utilities are possible.
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Distributed Generation and Harrisonburg Electric
Currently, HEC can only gain slight benefit from its own
generation capacity. Under its contract with Dominion,
there is a penalty for using HEC's generators to reduce its
peak load unless it can use it every day. Dominion charges
a Coincident Peak (CP) Demand charge based upon HEC's demand in kilowatts during the hour of the month that Dominion is producing its greatest amount. For example, if Dominion's biggest hour during the month of January is on
January 3rd at 8:00AM, then HEC pays a demand charge based
upon what it was drawing during that hour. In most cases,
this charge is as much as 50% of HEC's total electricity
costs. If HEC tries to mitigate that Peak Demand by running
some of its expensive generation and actually lowers the CP
too much then HEC will have to pay a penalty to Dominion in
the amount of the difference between Dominion's CP hour and
HEC's actual peak load during the month.

If HEC could implement DG that provides some peak shaving
capability, then DG would have a direct benefit to HEC's
profit for the month. However, due to the contract requirements, HEC would have to use the DG in the same way every
day. It could not simply predict the Peak Demand hour and
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use the DG during that hour. The DG would have to be implemented so as to reduce the peak load every day for HEC.

HEC enjoys a well-designed distribution system with plenty
of capacity. The benefit from DG that lowers the loads on
distribution systems would not be enjoyed by HEC in the
near future.
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Time of Use
Definition

Time of Use (TOU) is a term that is applied to electricity
rates that vary based upon the time of day and season of
the year. The original purpose for TOU was to allow the
utility to charge more for periods of time when demand was
at a peak. Most utilities have different types of generation that are categorized by how quickly they can respond
to changes in their loads. The cheapest to operate are the
'baseload' generators that do not respond quickly to load
changes. The most expensive type are the 'peak load' generators that can respond to load changes within minutes.
The utility keeps the baseload as steady as possible and
then fills in the load demand with peak generators. The TOU
rate allows the utilities to recover these higher costs
more evenly and predictably. Traditionally, this rate
structure was used with industrial customers and some commercial customers because their loads were large and exhibited high peak loads. Since the 1980's, the TOU rate has
been made available to the residential customer class as
well. This rate structure differs from what most residential customers currently use. The standard, single rate
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means that the customer pays one price for all electricity
independent from the time of day or the season of the year.
The standard rate is safe for the customer but a risk for
the utility.

The idea behind TOU is to match the rate for the residential customer to the actual generating costs of the utility. Regulators allowed TOU with the goal of lowering overall costs to the customer and giving the utilities a more
predictable profit. As with the industrial and commercial
classes, the TOU rate will be highest during the peak demand times such as a hot summer afternoon and will be lowest during the period of lowest demand such as between
12:00am and 7:00am during most of the year. By implementing
the TOU rate structure, the hope is to provide incentive
for the consumer to shift load demand to the off-peak
times. This policy could also help reduce the peak demands
for some utilities and allow them to lower costs. This policy could also help the utility make better use of their
baseload capacity which is usually idled to some degree
during off-peak times lowering generating efficiencies.
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Time of Use: Implementation
Figure 6 below shows how the residential TOU rates work at
Alabama Power. During the Winter Peak Hours, the rate is
$0.07 per kWh. During Summer Peak Hours, the rate is $0.25
per kWh. All other times have a rate of $0.05. This rate
structure is compared to the utility's standard ‘FD’ rate
which is $0.078 per kWh for every hour of the year and only
changes when the customer has reached a certain threshold
for the month[33;

34].

In the summer, the rate increases

slightly above 1000 kWh of consumption and in the winter
the rate decreases slightly above a monthly consumption of
750 kWh.
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Figure 6 - TOU Hours This diagram show the times of day and
months of the year where peak pricing is used in Alabama
Power's Time Advantage (a.k.a. TOU) rate offering

[35].

Similarly, Dominion Corporation's Virginia Power offers
residential TOU rates but with a different time and cost
structure. Virginia Power's peak hours are from 11:00am until 10:00pm during the summer and the peak rate is $0.1498
per kWh and off-peak rate is $0.0249

[36; 37].

For Virginia

Power there are no shoulder or mild-season months as shown
in Figure 6 for Alabama Power.
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Hydro One Networks Inc. is Ontario, Canada's largest utility. They offer residential TOU rates and have produced a
study as to the efficacy of the plan. The report is based
on a pilot study with 500

customers with services of less

than 50 kW. The goal was three-fold. First was to assess
the technical requirements to implement the TOU rates which
include new communication infrastructure between the utility and the customer. Second was to measure the impact of
an in-home, real-time monitoring device that allowed the
homeowner to know current power consumption and keep track
of the current power rate. The third goal was to measure
the change in behavior of the customers using the TOU rate
structure

[19].

Some of the general findings were:

• The typical customer on TOU rates, the load-shifting impact averaged 3.7% during peak hours in the summer months
and the conservation impact averaged 3.3%. The conservation impact is the total reduction of energy consumption
during all times.
• Providing the real-time monitoring to customers on TOU
rates helped them respond even more. On a normal summer
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day, the load-shifting impact averaged 5.5%, while the
conservation impact averaged 7.6%. On a hot summer day
(over 30°C), the load-shifting impact was even more pronounced at 8.5%.
• 76% of pilot participants under the TOU rates paid a lower
electricity bill as a result of load-shifting, compared to
the regular rates. Savings attributable to conservation
were incremental. Customers who were better off gained on
average about $23 during the pilot (about $6 per month),
while customers who were worse off on average lost about
$7 (less than $2 per month). (Note: The TOU rates used in
the pilot study in Ontario had peak rates of only $0.097
per kWh vs the Alabama Power rate of $0.25 and Virginia
Power peak rate of almost $0.15 per kWh. These higher
rates might have caused a different impact.)
• 72% of participants indicated that they would like to remain on the TOU rates, and 87% claimed they changed their
behavior during the pilot. Only 4% found the changes in
their daily activities in response to the TOU rates to be
inconvenient.
• 63% of participants with a real-time monitor found it useful to help them conserve electricity. On average, custom-
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ers thought they would save 9% on electricity consumption
by using them.

Time of Use: Pluses and Minuses
A major drawback of the TOU rate is the difficulty in implementing the rate for a homeowner because he rarely has
the ability to shift significant portions of his load without modifications to his systems. Other than running appliances at night or setting thermostats to a lower temperature during peak summer hours, the homeowner has very little ability to shift his electric load away from the peak
times. This drawback has caused many utilities to remove
the TOU rate from their offerings. Many of the TOU rates
that were offered after the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA) was enacted have either been greatly
changed or phased out completely since the 1980's.

The rate plans discussed above and many others like them
have been offered as a choice to the residential customer
for many years. The complexity of the TOU rate structure
and the lack of ability to actually monitor consumption
makes uninformed consumers frustrated because they are more
likely to see their power bills increase rather than de-
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crease under TOU. As Frank suggests in the Hydro One report, having a real-time monitoring device can help mitigate some of that increase

[19].

In all cases, the goal of the utility is to promote peak
load shifting through economic incentive/ penalty mechanisms. The difficulty in taking advantage of the incentive
means that this strategy must carefully be implemented.
However, as Frank indicates, there can be benefit to the
utility as well as some return to the customer in wellimplemented cases.

There are several benefits from the use of TOU rates that
have been mentioned. Lowering the utility's costs by reducing the amount of peak capacity generation can be significant. If using TOU can pass some of those savings to the
customer then both parties might share in the benefit of
using more baseload capacity and less peak generation.

A white paper produced by Colorado Springs Utilities dicusses these benefits[38]. The paper uses the term of 'load
factor' to measure what percentage of installed capacity is
being used at any particular time. A low load factor means
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that a small percentage of the potential capacity is being
used to generate electricity. A load factor of 1.0 means
that all capacity is being used. Because utilities have to
plan for that small percentage chance of a 1.0 load factor,
the total capacity must always be available or risk brownouts or blackouts for their customers. This excess capacity
adds expense to the utilities which must eventually be
passed to the customer. Therefore, a low load factor causes
the average price of electricity to be higher than the actual generating costs because a greater portion of the cost
is coming from the costs associated with the standby capacity. The goal of the utilities should be to get as close to
1.0 as possible which supposes that the daily demand curves
are level and the utilities can take full advantage of
their installed capacity. If TOU helps to remove the peaks,
then the demand for the utility will be more level thus
raising the load factor and lowering its costs.

Time of Use and Harrisonburg Electric
Because HEC buys most of its power from a regional producer, a large component of its electricity cost is a peak
demand charge. The peak demand charge is based upon HEC's
demand during the hour of the month that its supplier en-
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counters its greatest load. This hour might not coincide
with HEC's peak demand hour. The hour that the charge is
based upon is referred to as the Coincident Peak or CP.
HEC's true demand peak would then be referred to as its
Non-Coincident Peak or NCP.

Data provided by HEC has shown

that the CP and NCP are usually on the same day but might
differ by several hours. The charge is calculated as HEC's
CP demand in kilowatts multiplied by the suppliers Demand
Charge rate. For the purposes of this paper, the current
rate of $16.607 per kW will be used. The CP ranges from 95
kW to a high of 133.4 kW throughout the year.

This cost structure for HEC means that reducing the CP demand would be beneficial for HEC by reducing their costs
and thus increasing their profit. The TOU portion of the
model explores this impact on HEC’s profit, to the customer's power bill, and overall consumption using three
scenarios. The first scenario is implementing peak load
shifting with no rate change for the customer. Second is to
implement peak load shifting with the TOU rates implemented. Lastly, the model shows the impact from implementing just the TOU rates with no load shifting.
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Feed-in-tariffs
Definition
"A feed-in tariff (FIT) is an energy-supply policy focused
on supporting the development of new renewable power generation. In the United States, FIT policies may require
utilities to purchase either electricity, or both electricity and the renewable energy (RE) attributes from eligible
renewable energy generators."(page 2)[20] This FIT contract
provides a guaranteed payment for the full output of the
system for a guaranteed period of time.

The idea of the FIT is to promote Distributed Generation
(DG) growth and to improve market economies of scale thus
promoting a more sustainable, renewable energy source. A
FIT is a more formalized version of net metering. Under a
net metering arrangement, the utility company buys any excess generating capacity provided by a customer. An example
would be when a homeowner, using photovoltaics (PV)on his
roof, actually generated more electricity than was being
consumed. This excess would then be sold back to the utility at some variable cost that the utility generally determines. In a net metering application, the price paid by the
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utility is generally not high enough to justify the initial
investment in the PV system. Net metering became common
when the Public Utility Regulatory Policy Act (PURPA) was
passed in 1978. PURPA required utilities to pay for electricity produced by certain Qualifying Facilities if the
cost was less than their existing avoided cost. The avoided
cost for a utility is the marginal cost of the electricity
generation that would be 'avoided' if the electricity was
purchased from another producer. Qualifying Facilities were
generally large producers of electricity. In an attempt to
acknowledge smaller renewable energy sources such as a
homeowner with PV on the roof, utilities began net metering
programs.

FIT is different from net metering in that it contractually
sets the price that the utility will be required to pay for
a set time period. This time period is usually dozens of
years and is generally long enough for the homeowner or any
other independent producer to recover the capital costs of
the generating equipment. The contract is enforced through
legislation or public regulatory policy that sets the requirements and standards for the FIT. Although there are
several common methods for setting the FIT price, more suc-
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cessful FITs determine the price by calculating the levelized cost of the particular source which takes into account
the actual generating costs of the equipment including purchase, installation, and operation and maintenance. A more
formal definition of levelized cost by the U.S. Energy Information Administration is "Levelized cost represents the
present value of the total cost of building and operating a
generating plant over an assumed financial life and duty
cycle, converted to equal annual payments and expressed in
terms of real dollars to remove the impact of inflation.
Levelized cost reflects overnight capital cost, fuel cost,
fixed and variable O&M cost, financing costs, and an assumed utilization rate for each plant type" (page 1)[39]. By
using the levelized cost, more incentive is provided to invest in these systems. The cited Energy Information Administration (EIA) report provides examples of common energy
sources and the associated levelized cost shown in the table below.
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Figure 7- Levelized Generation Costs of Different Fuel
Sources Note that natural gas currently has a price advantage over most other sources which might explain that most
new generation is some form of natural gas-fired turbine.
Surprisingly, on-shore wind is competitive with conventional and advanced coal. In this chart ‘CCS’ refers to
carbon capture and sequestration[39].

The three most common pricing schemes for FITs are:
1.

A fixed price for each kilowatt-hour over the projected life of the system

2.

A fixed premium over the normal cost of electricity
that might fluctuate over time
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3.

A price equal to the normal cost of electricity with
a guaranteed minimum price

In scheme number 1, the price for the FIT payment remains
stable over time which creates stable investment conditions
and can provide a lower risk financing environment. In
scheme number 2, the fixed premium is intended to promote
investment by making the FIT price always higher than traditional sources for electricity. This option would be good
if prices remained very stable. Unfortunately, the normal
price might drop below that needed to recover investment
cost or might rise too high and provide the producer with
an unwarranted windfall. These possible fluctuations create
a riskier investment environment so the premium must be
priced accordingly. Scheme 3 attempts to limit both the upside and the downside of number 2 by placing a minimum
price on the FIT but not allowing the windfall if the spot
market price fluctuates too high. This plan has been used
successfully in both the Netherlands and Spain. One of the
drawbacks to scheme 3 is that it requires total transparency of the spot market pricing system. In de-regulated
markets that is usually the case but this is not so
throughout the United States. Another drawback is that the
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payment system is much more complex than the fixed payments
for #1 and 2. Scheme 3 requires a payment for normal price
plus a calculation relating to whether the FIT minimum gets
paid. This requires hourly tracking of prices and production and requires a very complicated accounting system to
implement[20].

Feed-in Tariffs: Implementation
A FIT can be applied to non-utility producers both large
and small.

Many FITs use different pricing for not just

the type of system (the source of the electricity) but also
the size of the system, acknowledging that the ultimate
purpose of a FIT is increase the benefits from scale. Normally large systems are paid a lower price than the smaller
scaled projects(generally < 25kW)[10].

The Feed-in-Tariff has a documented history that extends
back to 1978 and the passage of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act. Another outcome of PURPA was the use of
Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs). The PPA is essentially a
FIT that is granted on a per case basis. A PPA is a contract that is negotiated between a non-utility power producer and some buyer. The buyer might be a utility or the
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end user of the power. The problem with PPAs is that they
must be negotiated one contract at a time and have no set
standards or stipulations. FITs have these stipulations and
design options built into the legislation.

Portugal implemented a nationwide FIT in 1988 and Denmark,
Germany, and Spain instituted FITs in 1990, 1992, and 1994
respectively. Now there are successfully implemented FITs
in over 30 other countries[10]. Closer to home, FITs has also
been implemented in Gainesville, FL and in Ontario, Canada.
The program in Gainesville was started in March 2009 and in
its first 2 years, connected over 6MW of new PV and has
sold out its subscription limits for 2011 and 2012[40]. The
Gainesville plan has been so successful in lowering the
levelized costs of PV that the price offered in 2009 for
small systems of less than 10 kW was $0.32 per kWh has been
reduced $0.24 per kWh in 2012 contracts. Ontario, Canada
launched its first FIT in 2006. After some problems with
implementation and confusion from policy makers, a new FIT
was implemented in 2009. Ontario's FIT has induced over
15,000 MW of potential supply and is believed to be creating over 90,000 new jobs per year[10]. Several states have
passed legislation with forms of FITs but progress on ac-
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tual FITs (long-term, guaranteed price) has been made in
Vermont, Minnesota, Washington, and Arkansas.

Some FITs have not been successful. Argentina implemented a
FIT in 2006 that created a tariff level that was too low to
induce investment. Thus it has not reached its proposed
goal. South Korea passed FIT legislation that it is now
phasing out because of its expense. They had based the FIT
on a tax not related to energy and therefore during economic downturns, had overburdened the tax payer[10].

This well-documented history provides many examples of how
to and not to implement FITs.

Feed-in Tariffs: Pluses and Minuses
There are several perceived disadvantages to the Feed-in
tariff. The first is that the FIT is not a market-based
pricing structure because of its nature of being long-term
and fixed price. Miguel Mendonca, the author of Powering
the Green Economy-The Feed-in Tariff Handbook claims that
most of these complaints come from the utilities because a
FIT will impose additional requirements on their business
as usual practices. Mendonca points out that while it is
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true that FITs are not a market based pricing scheme, every
energy system in use today has required government intervention to overcome market barriers and challenges. The sshaped growth curve of normal markets does not move fast
enough to enable renewables to survive. This same problem
has been exemplified in the rural electrification of the
United States, the building of nuclear power plants, and
even the market growth of the fluorescent light bulbs. Mendonca suggests that the utility companies will need to find
a way to co-exist with FITs. The existing market structure
with monopolistic utilities has essentially locked out renewable energy with on-going subsidies to fossil fuels such
as exploration credits, resource depletion allowances and
subsidies to clean up their messes. It is difficult to make
small additions to the generation capacity because of past
restrictions utilities have had on the grid. Lastly, the
lack of external costs being included in the cost of our
traditional power sources keeps the true costs of coal,
gas, and oil artificially low. Because renewables still
produce the same basic product as a coal-fired plant, renewables must compete on price- not the improved features
provided by other new technologies[41].
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Another disadvantage is that a FIT is designed to embrace
new technology on a broad scale. This requires many installations and there might be problems with adding so many interconnections to the power grid. While this is a challenge, it is not a new challenge. Germany has integrated
over 350,000 PV installations into its grid and 90% are
small-capacity, home-based

[10].

The Department of Energy

through its national laboratories, trade groups such as the
Institute for Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE),
and even utility-sponsored organizations are aware of these
issues and have interconnection standards in place and are
updating them as necessary. Examples would be the IEEE 1547
and UL 1741 which address interconnection of distributed
generation to the grid, the safety issues, and the equipment requirements.

A perceived disadvantage of a FIT is that it generally involves renewable energy (RE) sources. The basic nature of
two of the biggest RE sources, PV and wind turbine, is that
they are intermittent. They do not operate 24 hours per
day, 7 days per week as is the perception of coal-fired
generators. What most people don't realize is that even
coal-fired plants are only operating 87.5% of the time on
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average. This requires the utility to have at least 15% of
reserve capacity at all times and even more to account for
unpredictable system failures such as transformer outages.
RE is added in smaller chunks so intermittency and failures
have smaller effect. RE has generally less downtime and because it is supplied as DG in most cases, it is not affected by transformer failures or even need to use the
transmission and distribution system in most cases. Also,
there are many ways to store the intermittent power from
RE. Pumped water storage has been used in many places
around the country for decades to store excess power produced during off-peak times. Other systems use compressed
air in underground cavities or even new battery storage
systems are beginning to be installed on a larger scale
than once realized[10]. These storage systems will become
more viable as RE capacity increases and the prices for the
power they produce come down.

The disadvantages of FITs have been discussed but what of
the advantages? If the U.S. energy policy addresses cleanness and security issues, then FIT can help address both.
As mentioned before, FITs involve growing the RE market and
the respective generating capacity. Because this RE is DG

68
in most cases, then by its nature RE is more secure. Former
CIA Director James Woolsey argues for FITs because they
promote DG and DG is a more resilient (secure) system[10] No
one system failure in a DG system can remove power from
millions of homes and offices like occurred in the blackouts of 1965 and 2003.

Concerning the cleanness issue, there is little debate that
RE is a cleaner source of electricity as far as greenhouse
gases emissions are concerned. PV and wind turbines will
never emit GHG while producing electricity. These technologies have no continual use of water and produce no ash,
mercury, or any other pollutants while in production[10].

FITs have been shown to drive down production and installation costs of their components which makes RE more competitive each year. FITs can promote a diversified portfolio of
technologies because the prices are based upon levelized
costs given that no one technology is picked as the winner
in a properly designed FIT. FITs have been shown to produce
jobs. FITs promote investment by reducing risk in cost recovery and removing the 'used and useful' regulatory re-
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quirement because the FIT is legislated and pre-negotiated
and therefore outside of further regulatory review.

The final advantage FITs is that they can enable achievement of Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS) that have been
enacted by well over half of the states in the U.S. RPS
legislation generally sets goals for Investor-Owned Utilities (IOU) for purchasing electricity from RE sources.
While many states have passed the law, some are struggling
with meeting their goals due to lackluster investment. Because RPSs tend to promote low cost implementations of RE,
they tend to discourage diversification in RE portfolios.
Most RPS projects tend to be large in scale so favor large
companies and small businesses or homeowners cannot compete. The demand for capacity is stable but because the
price is not guaranteed, the investment contains higher
risk. FITs can address all of these problems[20].

In summary, Feed-in Tariffs can have numerous benefits. The
FIT legislation must be designed properly but once implemented, it has an impressive track record in promoting renewable energy and the benefits that come with it.
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Feed-in Tariffs and Harrisonburg Electric
If the primary goal of Feed-in tariffs is to promote the
growth of DG and more precisely, renewable DG, then there
is certainly long term benefit to HEC for implementing
FITs. If a FIT is properly instituted, there will be no unrecoverable cost to HEC. The increased cost of electricity
due to the FIT will be paid by all customers over the life
of the program. The benefits to HEC would include the increased Distributed Generation in its system, the ability
of PV to lower peak demand in the summer months, and the
goodwill that FITs can generate by promoting renewable energy production. There will not be other any cost benefit
to HEC at this time. Because their system has excess distribution capacity and is not currently near equipment limits, the increased DG in HEC's system would not benefit
their system or produce savings from limiting the need to
expand capacity.
Energy Efficiency
Definition
The term energy efficiency (EE) can be used as an economic
term that represents how the cost of energy changes over
time as it used to generate an economic output. This type
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of EE can be driven by lower cost energy inputs as well as
a lower ratio of energy input to energy output. An example
would be the cost of coal over the last 130 years as an input into the production of electricity. From 1880 to 1960,
the thermal efficiency of using coal improved by more than
a factor of 10 meaning that 10 times more electricity could
be produced from the same amount of coal

[42].

This gain in

efficiency had the effect in the past of making electricity
marginal costs cheaper because less coal was necessary to
produce equal outputs of electricity even while accounting
for slight increases in the cost of coal. However, in this
paper, the energy efficiency strategy also refers to a
method of reducing overall consumption of energy in the
form of electricity. A definition provided by the American
Council for Energy Efficiency is: ' The cost-effective investment in the energy we don't use to produce our nation's
goods and services '[43]. Amory Lovins calls it 'Negawatts'.
A simpler form might be paying more money now for a product
that will use less energy and thus cost less to operate
over the life of the product. The model evaluates EE using
this definition as it relates to the residential customer.
While the model will show some of the economic benefits
from the EE, reducing the actual amounts of electricity
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consumption are the primary focus of the EE strategy in
this paper.

This reduction in consumption might occur in two ways. One
is through lifestyle changes of the consumer. The second is
by implementing new, more efficient equipment in the home.
Another description of these two concepts is the idea of
saving electricity by doing something differently versus
doing the same thing with less energy. The lifestyle
changes could also be called energy 'conservation' since it
refers to behavioral changes that help an individual to
consume less electricity. Examples of these changes to behavior would be turning off lights when the homeowner
leaves a room or setting back the thermostat when he goes
to work. Implementing new equipment would require a homeowner to make the decision to purchase and install a new
appliance or water heater that is more efficient than the
one currently in use. This action usually occurs at the end
of the service life of the existing appliance, would require capital expenditure and is very seldom done inside
the life expectancy of the appliance. Examples might be a
refrigerator with an EnergyStar rating or a geothermal heat

73
pump that is more efficient than a traditional air-to-air
heat pump.

Energy efficiency is important because it represents a way
of addressing the energy policy issues without building new
electricity capacity. From 1996 to 2006, electricity demand
in the U.S. grew 1.7% per year. The Energy Information Administration projects the growth to be 1.07% each year until 2030 which represents a total increase of 26%. Even
though historical trends indicate a much higher growth
rate, the EIA projections take some EE into account as a
result of newer building codes and some market-driven efficiency improvements. There have been several papers written
that project the EE potential during this time period. The
EPRI report

[44]

estimates that this EIA annual growth could

be reduced by one-fifth to 0.83% per year through EE practices. In terms of total electricity the reduction in
growth would represent an annual savings of approximately
11 terawatt hours with a combined total of 236 terawatt
hours or 236,000,000 megawatt hours by the year 2030. This
represents the average output of more than 7 average sized,
coal-fired generating plants over the same time span[2].

74
The EPRI study breaks the potential gains from EE into
three possible scenarios:
1. Technical potential- Includes all households and businesses adopting potential EE practices regardless of cost
2. Economic potential - Includes all households and businesses adopting potential EE practices based upon economic
cost-effectiveness of the individual practice
3. Achievable potential- Includes all households and businesses adopting potential EE practices based a more practical standard and falls into two sub-categories:
!

a. Maximum Achievable Potential (MAP)- account

for markets, societal barriers, attitudes
!

b. Realistic Achievable Potential (RAP)- starts

with MAP and accounts for financial, regulatory, and political barriers

The estimate of combined annual savings of 236 terawatt
hours (5% of the total year-end consumption) provided above
represents the RAP scenario. In comparison, the EPRI study
suggests that the MAP scenario would increase the savings
further to a combined savings of 382 terawatt hours by the
year 2030.
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There are other reports that have assessed the potential
energy savings through energy efficiency programs. A McKinsey report takes a more aggressive approach to EE and shows
a potential reduction in residential loads of over 6000
trillion BTU's of primary energy inputs, 4000 trillion of
which are electricity. This total corresponds to 1172 TWh
of power generation through the year 2020. This reduction
comes from a mix of 129 million homes and 2.5 billion electronic devices

[45].

The most notable difference in the pre-

sent research is the use of primary energy inputs instead
of end use measurement. Because of energy losses in converting fuels to electricity, transmission losses, and end
use equipment losses, the 1172 TWh only represents about
615 TWh of improvement for the homeowner at their meter.
The study also discusses investment payback for EE. By assigning costs to the potential strategies and comparing the
savings from the electricity savings, Granade suggests that
the total projected investment required would only represent half of total energy savings through 2020. However,
this investment challenge represents a tenfold increase in
investment amounts in EE.
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A paper from the School of Public Policy at Georgia Institute of Technology summarizes a number of national and regional studies to show that the projected path of this nation's energy consumption is a sobering view of unsustainable practices

[46].

Chandler also uses the summaries to ex-

emplify possible paths of an EE strategy and its large number of benefits. These benefits include GHG reduction,
fewer new generating plants, and lowered consumption of energy inputs in the United States. Another report by the
trade group, American Public Power Association, discusses
how investor-owned utilities (IOU's) can or should recover
lost revenue from the effects of energy efficiency programs. IOU's have already installed capacity to handle certain electric loads. If the load is diminished through EE,
then the costs associated with the installed capacity become stranded or unrecovered without special rate treatment
to deal with the losses. This problem for IOU's makes EE a
modern issue for regulators

[47].

It is clear that much can be done to implement a EE strategy which would provide at least partial fulfillment of the
cheap, secure, and clean requirements for our energy policy.
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Energy Efficiency: Implementation
The literature provides guidance on how EE might be implemented. According to the EPRI study, large potential residential opportunities[48] under the RAP scenario are:
1.

installing and using a programmable thermostat

2.

more efficient central air conditioning

3.

repair of leaking duct work in residential systems.

Studies have shown that by repairing the duct work in all
residential central air conditioning could generate a reduction of 1 Terawatt hours by the year 2030. Using a programmable thermostat under the RAP scenario could generate
reductions of over 10 TWh. Other potential opportunities
are weatherization, new water heaters, and the use of inhome energy displays to prompt consumer behavior to conserve.

One aspect of EE strategies that is often overlooked is the
effect of compounding. By applying EE strategies in aggregate, the energy use reductions can be compounded. For example, if a homeowner installs new, insulated windows and
new lighting and a more efficient air conditioner here are
the reductions:

78
1. Windows allow less heat in the house so shades don't
have to be drawn as often
2. More natural light means even fewer lights are needed
3. Fewer, more efficient lights generate even less heat
4. The more efficient AC can be sized smaller because of
new windows and less lighting
5. The resulting reduction in end use electricity means
even less electricity has to be generated because of
transmission losses
These compounded benefits are not available if the strategies are installed separately.

There are several possible drivers of EE adoption. One
would be traditional market forces. Homeowners can be convinced to buy new, more efficient technologies through advertising and word-of-mouth. An example is the widespread
adoption of flat-screen televisions. There also regulatory
drivers for EE adoption. These might take the form of laws
that outlaw incandescent bulbs or new building codes that
require better insulation in a new house. There are also
utility programs that might provide incentive to the homeowner to make changes to their behavior to save money. Although this might be considered another form of market
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force, it represents a different form of motivation to
adopt- the motivation of cost savings.

So if EE is easy and offers great payback potential why has
it not been implemented? Actually, there have been improvements in the pursuit of EE. Since 1980, average residential
loads have been reduced by 11% per square foot. Even
greater improvements have been made in the commercial and
industrial customer classes. The projections from the EIA
for energy intensity have improved in the last 5 years by
accounting for greater EE implementation. However, realizing the greatest improvements requires large up-front investments but with benefits that are spread out over the
life of the system. The payback period can be greater than
10 years for some strategies. The actual nationwide results
are also hard to measure because of the broad dispersion
required for the strategy to be successful.

The barriers to the implementation of EE strategies can be
grouped into 3 categories. There are structural barriers
that prevent an end-user from having a choice. An example
would be an apartment renter who cannot choose what model
of air conditioner is bought. Another structural barrier is
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the problem of pricing distortions from low adoption rates
due to regulatory issues. If the government has not allowed
easy access to the grid or not forced utilities to pay reasonable rates for energy produced or energy saved by their
customers, then few people will adopt EE practices.

The second barrier type, behavioral barriers, include a
lack of homeowner awareness of potential EE strategies.
Lifestyle inertia (resistance to lifestyle changes) keeps
people from changing to do new things like turn off the
lights or pay attention to energy consumption and how they
relate to power bills.

The third barrier is availability. There are instances
where the end-user wants to make a change but a lack of access to capital prohibits it. For example, if a homeowner
must replace her heating system, a lack of savings or lack
of banks that provide 'green' mortgages makes the new heating system too expensive.

According to Granade

[45],

the largest hurdle in addressing

these barriers is the absence of a comprehensive policy.
Because the barriers are extremely fragmented, it is diffi-
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cult to foment change. Up to now there have been pilot programs, programs available only at the local level, and
plenty of misinformation that has confused homeowners as to
the benefits of EE. There are numerous categories of improvement but they are spread over millions of locations
and billions of devices. This one fact guarantees that EE
will not be a top priority for anyone because no one person
can benefit greatly from just efficiency improvements. Granade suggests that the U.S. needs a national policy that
recognizes EE as a potential source of energy in its own
right . The study suggests the following needed actions.
1. Launch a complete EE program national and regional
levels
2. Identify methods to offset up-front costs
3. Align the goals of the stakeholders- utilities, regulators, governments, consumers, manufacturers

Proposed solutions can be categorized into four areas.
1. information and education
2. incentives and financing
3. codes and standards
4. third party involvement to assist in implementation
for the non-do it yourselfers
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If these solutions are implemented at the national level
then the three needed actions listed above will be accomplished and most of the barriers can be overcome.

In a study by Niemeyer, homeowners provided their view of
the barriers to EE adoption

[49].

The study sent a survey to

800 random homeowners in the state of Nebraska. There were
239 respondents that fit a diverse profile of location,
sex, and education. The average age was 58 years but for
most (~150 of the respondents), monthly utility costs were
'somewhat of a problem' or worse. For this group, the biggest three barriers for making changes to the energy efficiency of their home were:
1. Need financial assistance or discount on costs
2. Need added information
3. Need professional or additional assistance
These top three barriers in the homeowners' view would be
addressed by the solutions suggested by Granade.

Energy Efficiency: Pluses and Minuses
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The minuses for EE strategies are few. Most of the negative
aspects apply to a particular stakeholder. Four examples
are:

1. Utilities will lose electricity sales from EE implementation that will directly affect their profit.
2. Manufacturers that sell products that are not energy
efficient will certainly lose sales.
3. Homeowners that decide to implement EE ideas will most
likely not receive the full payback due to the current
trends in length of homeownership.
4. Landlords do not have any incentive to spend more
money on more efficient products because they will not
directly benefit from lower energy costs.

All of these minuses would exist in free market economies
and require some modification to the structure of the market or behavior of the stakeholders in order to eliminate
them.

The pluses of EE are too numerous to list in this paper but
all can generalized into three broad advantages.
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1. Lower electricity requirements for the U.S.
2. Slow the growth in Green House Gas emissions
3. Reduce the cost of operating a household

Energy Efficiency and Harrisonburg Electric
In the model, EE is implemented by using inputs that represent the homeowner choosing to adopt a EE strategy. The
specific strategies that the model uses are installing more
efficient lighting, improving appliance efficiency, and improving the efficiency of the HVAC system. The cost structures of each of these strategies are included for both installation and electricity savings.

For HEC, there will be little benefit for implementing EE
unless government incentives become available to the municipal electrical distributor. However, corporate goodwill
is certainly important for most companies. Some utilities
market heavily to their customers concerning new, efficient
products but most are thinly veiled attempts to switch from
natural gas consumption to electricity or to sell more devices that would use more electricity. HEC has little incentive to reduce consumption but does need to manage its
corporate image. More discussion of the model and how it
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can be used by HEC occurs in the chapter entitled "The
Model'.

Summary of the Policies
The four policies or strategies presented in this paper are
viable methods to address the current energy policy issues.
Individually, they can provide some benefit to the U.S. but
what if they are used in combination? What might the interaction be between FIT and TOU? Are the benefits additive or
might they cancel each other's benefits out. Some have suggested that the four strategies will work to enhance each
other thus giving us a stronger strategy[18]. To study this
possibility, it is important to understand the characteristic effect of the four strategies. Each has benefits and
drawbacks.
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Below is a chart that summarizes the effect of individual
strategies on energy load and costs.

Figure 8 - Individual Strategy Summary

The Base Load, Peak Load, and Purchased Load columns in
Figure 8 represent the effect on electricity production and
indirectly, the costs associated with these categories. The
T&D column represents the amount of electricity that is
conducted through the Transmission and Distribution infrastructure. The Electrical Consumption and Consumer Bill
columns are measures of effects on the customer and the
Capital $$$ column represents whether any capital expenditures are necessary to implement the policy. There is no
differentiation between which party pays them. These costs
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could be paid by the homeowner, the utility, or a third
party acting as an ESCO (Energy Service Company).

It is clear from Figure 8 that there is no one best policy
or strategy. Three interesting results from individual
policies are circled in blue. The first is the fact that
using DG still allows total electrical consumption to increase over time. There is no incentive from a DG policy
that causes a reduction in consumers use of electricity.
The second interesting fact is that under a FIT policy,
utilities cost for purchased load will increase. The very
nature of the FIT means that the utility will be forced to
pay a levelized cost for the DG whether it be photovoltaic,
wind turbine, or something else. These extra costs must be
accounted for in the cost structure of the utility. The
third interesting fact is that Time-of-Use can have either
a positive or negative effect on the consumer bill. From
the standpoint of the utility, a TOU rate structure is easy
to implement especially as the Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) or Smart Meter continues to grow. The outcome question depends on the view point of the consumer.
There is no easy implementation for the homeowner to shift
their load to other times of the day. The consumer can
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choose to wash laundry after midnight but how many people
actually will? There will have to be some residential infrastructure changes made to make a TOU policy beneficial
to the homeowner. This change could be some type of energy
storage implementation. Many electrical distributors in the
U.S. have tried to implement TOU rates. Some are still offered but other have been abandoned for just these reasons.
Customers end up with higher bills for lack of proper implementation of the strategy.

Finally, depending upon how these four policies affect the
utilities cost and income structures, there will be some
impact from the regulatory process. Simply shifting utility
equity from retired, large scale generating plants to
smaller scale distributed generation might impact the regulators' view of allowed rate of return for the utilities
and what is considered "used and useful". If there is impact on the profit margin by implementing these policies,
there will also need to be some adjustment to the rates
charged by the utilities. If a FIT were implemented and the
program was highly successful, then the entire utility customer base will be impacted by the FIT. The costs associated with paying out the FIT rates will need to be recov-
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ered. In the most successful FIT implementations, this is
achieved by raising all rates. These issues and any other
regulatory questions will certainly need to be a part of
any change in how the utilities conduct their business.

The Model

Why System Dynamics
System Dynamics (SD) modeling and the Stella software platform were chosen for this paper for several reasons. The
System Dynamics methodology is typically used in long-term,
strategic models of complex systems. Examples of these complex systems are corporate strategic planning, biological
systems, or human/environment systems. SD usually employs a
high level of aggregation of the objects being modeled and
is not concerned with fine details. In SD, individual attributes of an item are not accounted for, only their behavior as a group over time.

The time-tested metaphor of SD is the model of a bathtub.
It has inflows that fill it up and outflows that empty it.
SD doesn't notice that the inflow might be blue or red,
only that it is all water. Over time, the behavior of the
volume in the tub is of interest to the modeler. Is the tub
filling up, emptying, or is its level staying the same?
What happens when a particular flow doubles in quantity?
What happens if the outflow is delayed for some amount of
time? These dynamics are of interest to the SD modeler.
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Other attributes might be included in the model such as the
temperature of the water or the color of the water or even
how much that water costs. These attributes would be represented as separate stocks. The modeler would have a temperature stock and a color stock with different flows for
inputs and outputs.

Many of the dynamics in this paper's model could also be
represented by another methodology called Discrete Event
System (DES) based modeling. In Discrete Event, each object
is modeled individually as an entity. Typically the modeler
ignores many "physical level" details, such as exact geometry, accelerations, and decelerations. Discrete modeling is
generally considered process-centric modeling. Processcentric modeling suggests that this process represents a
linear sequence of operations such as an assembly line.
This method is used widely in the manufacturing, logistics,
and healthcare fields

[50].

According to Sweetser, there are

no feedback loops explicitly accounted for in a DES model
and the focus is on the measurable aspects of the process
[51].

He admits that there are many systems that can be mod-

eled using both DES and SD methodologies but that for DES
the numbers are important and for SD the behavior and
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structure are the focus. The modeler may have to adjust the
detail of the model but similar outcomes can be achieved
with many types of models as suggested in Ozgun[52].

The model in this paper needs to focus on both behavior and
quantities due to the complexity of the system. Electricity
costs and consumption are quantities that represent outcomes of different strategies and behaviors. How consumers
and utilities respond to these outcomes are also a necessary part of the analysis. What makes this model somewhat
unique is that there are multiple timescales of interest.
In the limited experience of this modeler, the behavior of
interest is usually related to one timescale. It could be
seconds for a biological system or decades for a government
policy. A request from the U.S. Department of Energy in
1992 resulted in a report generated by the National Research Council concerning how a national energy model could
be implemented. In the discussion of the National Energy
Modeling System (NEMS) architecture, the authors noted that
differing time horizons require different analytical methods. For that reason, they recommended producing three different models for the three time horizons of interest;
short-term (<2 yrs), medium term (between 2 and 25 yrs),
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and long term (>25 yrs)[53]. However, the hourly consumption
of electricity, the daily swings in the total load, the
seasonal cycle of the demand for electricity, as well as
several multi-year behaviors are all of interest in this
model. If they all can be implemented into one model correctly then why not? The only drawback from these multiple
time horizons is the requirement to run a small time step
(hourly) for multiple years (>10) to see all of the behaviors. Each year has 8760 hours so 10 years requires 87,600
time steps. Each run of the model will take in excess of 15
minutes. This delay limits the number of tests that can be
quickly run for the client, HEC.

Note: Based upon the research questions for this thesis, a
limit is placed on the runs of a single year. The behaviors
of interest to HEC currently are the immediate effects of
the strategies on their costs and the total bill to the
residential customer. The model however, is built to allow
a look at other behaviors in future work.

In the U.S., the electricity demand swings from peaks to
valleys every day as discussed in the TOU chapter. Utilities must plan for changes in these daily peaks throughout
the year because the peak during summer is at a different
time and has a different value than the daily peak in April
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or January. The capacity margin that utilities must maintain to handle these peaks requires multi-year plans because new capacity has traditionally taken more than five
years to install. Studies have also shown that while there
is very little elasticity in the price of electricity for
consumers in the short term (less than 1 year) there is
definitely some response to higher or lower prices in the
long term

[54].

As appliances or HVAC equipment require re-

placement, consumers will make purchase decisions based
upon such things as cost of operation from electricity.
This behavior stretches into decades.

Measurement of electricity loads and rate structures will
be important. The timing of the 'flows' of cost and electricity will interact with each other. Human factors such
as technology adoption rates will be inserted into the
model to show behavior over longer time periods. The diversity of these behaviors make the topic of this paper complex but the nature of these behaviors and how they interact is the primary focus and is why System Dynamics has
been chosen. How all of these behaviors affect each other
will help determine the outcomes from implementing the four
strategies of Distributed Generation (DG), Feed-in Tariffs
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(FIT), Time of Use rates (TOU), and Energy Efficiency (EE).
The analysis will address any significant effect from feedback and what time frame is important.

Although other modeling methods can account for system
feedbacks and their dynamics, System Dynamics is not only
robust in showing the structure of a system's feedback but
also in showing the effects of the feedback. Because of
System Dynamics' use of Causal Loop Diagrams and Stock and
Flow structures, a system's feedback can be represented
graphically and expressed algebraically. Much of this paper's model could be represented in a spreadsheet, although
a very complex, convoluted spreadsheet. However, a spreadsheet does not visually express the causal links between
objects in the model. The connections are hidden within the
algebra and inter-cell references. The Stella platform offers marked improvement over spreadsheets in terms of programming and transparency. It is a software product produced by ISEE Systems expressly for SD models. Its graphical interface brings the advantage of being able to see the
linkages between elements of the model so the user can easily visualize and verify what parts might affect others.
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In this paper's model, there are several feedback effects
that will be included in the design. The first is the action of the regulatory system. Investor owned utilities are
regulated by state or regional authorities to keep their
monopolistic nature in check. If utilities profit moves
outside of a predetermined range, then the regulatory body
steps in to adjust rates or other income streams. The
utilities must remain viable and be guaranteed a minimum
return to their investors. Likewise, utilities must not be
allowed to profit too greatly by exerting market control
over a necessary commodity. In this model, the regulatory
aspect will simply be a check on profit. Because Harrisonburg Electric is a municipally owned utility, it does not
fall under the Virginia regulatory body, the State Corporation Commission. In this case, there is no regulator other
than the HEC Commissioners as they respond to public concerns about rates and work to make sure HEC remains a viable business.

The second feedback implemented in the model is the customer response to the success of the Energy Efficiency
strategy. If the payback of the EE investments is significant then the adoption rate of customers will increase. Be-
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cause adoption rates are not linear responses to price or
profit, the shape of the adoption rate curve will ultimately determine how much EE gets implemented. If the cost
of EE changes for reasons such economies of scale or improved technology then adoption rate will change. For example, LED lighting is by the far the most efficient lighting
source for residential use. The price for LED lighting per
lumen has dropped from about $10 in the 1970's to $1 in the
1980's and to about $0.10 in the 1990's

[55].

These improve-

ments are expected to continue through improved LED efficiency and economies of scale. This additional causal link
to the price of the EE investments is not implemented for
this paper but could be included in future work.

The third feedback originally considered but ultimately not
implemented makes the link between HEC and its desire to
implement the strategies. There will be capital costs associated with the TOU, DG, and EE strategies. The FIT strategy is a secondary step for DG and will have some administrative costs but a properly implemented FIT should not
have capital costs that are not already covered by the DG
implementation. From the TOU, DG, and EE strategies, HEC
will see changes in their profits based upon which of the
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strategies are used. If their profits can increase to the
point where the regulatory adjustments kick in, then the
excess could be spent on more capital equipment to implement more of the strategies. This use of the profits would
mitigate changes to the rate structure for the residential
class customer. This feedback was not implemented after final discussion with HEC. HEC has no long range planning so
this feedback is insignificant to them currently. Further
development will be necessary to make this portion of the
model useful to HEC.

These three feedback effects are only a sample of the dynamics that occur in this system. They were chosen as the
starting point for discussion with the client, HEC. Much
future work is possible as the needs of the client become
more apparent. Feedbacks not implemented in the model at
this time are the causal links associated with longer time
horizons. These could be implemented into this model while
acknowledging the delays to run multiple simulations as
noted above. Perhaps a more practical implementation of
these particular feedbacks would be to create a more aggregated model that does not include the hourly data and simply includes the behaviors specific to the long term. In
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particular, other feedbacks not included in the analysis in
this paper are:

• The link between greenhouse gases and a warmer climate
that would affect the demand curves of the customers; If
it is hotter then the residential customer will run more
air conditioning and peak demand will increase thus creating a need for more fossil fueled electricity generation. Most projections point to this effect taking decades to change electrical demands.

• The effects from construction delays associated with new
generation plant construction; As demand continues to
grow as projected, utilities will have to construct new
capacity. The traditional, centralized plants require
more than five years to plan, permit, build and bring
online. Because the model is based upon HEC, there is no
need for new capacity in the near future.

• The limitation of the current Transmission and Distribution system; Although this is not a problem for HEC,
some utilities have T&D systems that are nearing capacity. As demand grows and the systems continue to age,
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more capacity will be needed or limits will have to be
placed on total electricity delivered in the form of
brownouts or even rolling blackouts.

• The link between a FIT policy and its affect on installation costs of the required DG equipment; One of the
main purposes of a FIT is to reduce the total installation cost of DG such as photovoltaics or wind turbines.
This result, as shown in FIT programs in Europe and
Gainesville, FL, comes from creating more expertise and
competition in the installation of these technologies
and also from the increase in economies of scale in
their manufacturing.

The Model Structure

Building the CLD
To build a System Dynamics model, the process usually
starts with a Causal Loop Diagram (CLD). A CLD breaks a
system down into the components that are of interest to the
modeler. In the case of this paper's model, the beginning
point is the diagram below. Figure 9 shows a simple view of
the distribution of electricity. Electricity is generated
by a utility and it is sold to the customer, who then uses
it. The boxes represent stocks or quantities of things. The
double-line arrows with valve symbols are flows which represent movement to or from a stock.
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Figure 9 - CLD Starting Point

To make the model as accurate as possible and complete as
necessary, more components are added to the CLD that represent the behavior that is to be analyzed. Figure 10 shows
that there are two components that contribute to the Generation stock. There may be others but for most utilities,
their generation comes in two distinctions, baseload and
peak capacities as described in the TOU chapter. Also included in Figure 10 is a recognition that the electricity
demand is growing.

Figure 10 - CLD with added components

The variable Demand Growth is modeled as the projected annual growth and is derived from the U.S. Department of Energy's EIA projections. By adding these three new variables, the model immediately becomes more dynamic.
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Figure 11 - CLD with financial aspects

In Figure 11 above, the model now includes some financial
aspects of the system. The stocks added are representations
in dollars of the utility's generation costs, the customer's electric bill, and the utility's profit from the
difference of the two. The two auxiliary variables for
utility costs help break out the difference between
baseload and peak generation sources
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Figure 12 - CLD showing the four strategies of this thesis

The final CLD is shown above in Figure 12 and includes the
four policies or strategies that are the basis of the
analysis in the simulation. From the causal arrows connecting the four strategies (DG, FIT, TOU, and EE) one can see
which stocks are affected. TOU is the implementation of a
new rate structure. EE directly affects the amount of electricity that is consumed which then affects the customer's
bill. To show how a feedback loop would be considered, the
consumer's bill would then have some affect on whether
changes were made to the EE strategy. DG would not directly
affect the amount electricity that is consumed but how much
is sold by the utility. DG would also have direct impact on
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a FIT if it were implemented but the FIT itself would only
directly affect the consumer's bill and the utility's
costs.

As described in the previous section, there are many behaviors and components that could be addressed by this model.
The author has made every attempt to define the included
behaviors and list some that have intentionally been left
out. If the reader discovers omissions or even undiscovered
behavior that should be in the model please contact the
author, Brooks E Taylor at TaylorBE@Dukes.jmu.edu.

Building the Model
The model for this thesis was constructed using ISEE Systems Stella software. A baseline model was first created to
validate the cost and income structure for HEC. After HEC's
customer load data and cost information was gathered, the
baseline model was demonstrated for an executive of HEC.
The structure of the model in terms of the mechanisms for
costs and sales was verified. It was also concluded that
the results were compatible with the real system. Since
real, historical data was used, the outputs of the model
were able to be compared to the real outcomes in terms of
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total consumption and profit. Below (Figure 13) is a picture of the Stella model for the baseline scenario.

Figure 13 - Baseline Model using Stella software

There are several notable features of the Baseline model.
The Peak Demand Picker is the logic that picks the Peak Demand hour for each month and then uses it to calculate
HEC's Coincident Peak Charge which can be more than 50% of
the utility's total electricity cost. Another is the characteristic that the Peak Diesel and Peak Turbine generators
are currently used very little by the utility. The cost to
run the generation is high. Also, the supply contract that
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HEC is currently under prohibits the use of the generation
capability to mitigate its peak demand charges.

The third notable facet of the model is that the customer
load is modeled by representing two characteristics. The
first characteristic is the way total demand is calculated
each hour of a month for each of the four seasons. The
model currently uses typical January hourly data to represent the winter months of December through March; it uses
typical April hourly data to represent the 'shoulder'
months of low load swings of April and May; it uses typical
June hourly data to represent the summer months of June
through August; and the model uses typical October data to
represent the milder 'shoulder' months of September through
November. This calculation is made in the 'Determine Season' variable. The reason for these representations is to
limit the size of the sample data but also to allow for
flexibility when the model is adjusted for other regions
and utilities. The second important characteristic of the
customer load calculation is the fact that the model is using only the percentage of the total load that represents
the residential customer class. This percentage changes
throughout the year so the variable is represented as a ta-
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ble of month versus percentage values. Therefore the Residential class portion is calculated by multiplying the total monthly load by a percentage that is the residential
portion.

This table of percentages is found in the vari-

able 'Residential %' The reason the percentage changes is
because residential loads in the winter months have a large
component of water heating and electric space heating that
commercial customers do not. In the summer, the commercial
class has a larger percentage because their air conditioning loads are much larger than residential A/C.

The complete model for this thesis is much more complex
than the Baseline. In order to accommodate all of the necessary aspects, the model uses modules to break the logic
into components. The current model has five modules. They
are called Utility Power, Utility Economics, Customer
Power, Customer Economics, and Regulatory. The Power modules hold the logic concerning generation and consumption
of electricity. The Economics modules hold the logic that
calculate the utility's costs and the customers' total bill
each month. The Regulatory module contains the current
logic for determining whether the utility's percent profit
is out of a pre-determined range. All of these modules
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share information through their variables and causal links.
Below (Figure 14) is the highest layer of the model showing
the five modules and the interconnections of information
that is shared between them.

Figure 14 - Thesis Model, top level

The Utility Power module uses the same structure as the
Baseline model represented by the blue components in Figure
13.

The Customer Power module (Figure 15) contains the more
complex consumption calculations for how a customer uses
electricity. These calculations and structure include the
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peak shifting capability that will be necessary to test the
TOU strategy. The TOU strategy implements a peak shifting
or peak shaving plan that allows the utility to reduce
power consumption during peak hours and move that consumption to off peak or trough periods. These usually occur
during the night after midnight. The model must find the
peaks and troughs in the data and track them. It does so by
keeping the daily maximum and minimum values for the previous seven days. What the model supposes is that the utility
will store energy in some form during the troughs when its
load is at its lowest point. The model then releases that
energy when it finds a potential peak and its load is going
above the seven day average peak. By lowering all peaks
above the seven day average, this method will have the effect of lowering the Coincident Peak that the utility will
be charged for at the end of the month. For HEC, the reduction of just the residential peak load by 10% would result
in monthly savings of tens of thousands of dollars.

The Customer Power module also contains the logic for implementing the DG sources for the FIT strategy which includes DG for wind, photovoltaic, and Combined Heat & Power
(CHP). There many other possible sources for distributed
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generation such as small hydro, fuel cells, or concentrated
solar so the three chosen are simply representative of the
style. They are small and located close to the electricity
end user.

Figure 15 - Customer Power module

The Utility Economics module looks very similar to the
Baseline model structure. The new module, shown below in
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Figure 16, now includes the cost of the DG and logic that
tracks the costs of the DG/FIT implementation. Because the
FIT is essentially a contract to purchase power from the
owner of the DG, its costs will directly add to the cost of
electricity for the utility. If the model runs for the life
of the FIT then the utility will see these costs diminish
to prices that are more comparable to the generated power
that the utility produces itself or in the case of HEC,
purchases from wholesale producers.

The capital costs required to implement the strategies result from costs associated with the DG and peak shifting.
These costs would include the installation costs of the
strategy and any operation and maintenance costs if they
are significant. In this implementation of the model, the
only O&M costs are associated with the CHP because of the
regular maintenance and fuel costs required to operate the
micro-turbines. The model does not assign these costs to a
stakeholder. It merely breaks them out for the sake of
strategy analysis.

113
Finally, the new module includes some new annual accounting
that can be used for multi-year analysis, which for this
paper will not be utilized.

Figure 16 - Utility Economics module

The Customer Economics module is made more complex by the
FIT income produced, the savings from EE, and the changes
to

'Annual Energy Sales' (found in Figure 17) due to addi-

tional logic for the electricity sales rate structure.
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TOU rates are offered by numerous utilities around the U.S.
The author first incorporated the rates associated with Dominion's Virginia Power. Contrary to prior experience, the
TOU rates negatively impacted the profit of HEC. After discussion with HEC, it was determined that this result was
due to HEC's cost structure. A majority of the electricity
in the U.S. comes from investor owned utilities that own
their own generation and therefore have baseload capacity
and peak load capacity. TOU rates would allow these utilities to reduce their costs for the peak load capacity which
is much more expensive. HEC does not have the same structure. Its capacity, what it buys from its supplier, has the
same cost every day of the year regardless of when it uses
it. Therefore HEC has less savings from reducing the demand
during peak times. In trying to find a more 'HEC friendly'
TOU rate structure, the rates from Alabama Power's TOU or
RTA (residential time advantage) were used. The rate is
graphically shown in Figure 6 in the Time of Use section of
this paper. The structure required the use of three time
periods during the year. These were the 'TOU Rate Summer',
'TOU Rate Winter', and 'TOU Off Season'.
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The other pieces of the rate structure besides the 'Normal
Rate price' are the 'Fuel Adjustment' charge and the 'FIT
Rider'. The 'Fuel Adjustment' charge is how most utilities
recover annual changes to the cost of the fuel needed to
generate power. The adjustment has been as high as $0.02279
in 2008, as low as $0.01216 and is currently $0.01723 per
kWhkWh. The 'FIT Rider' is the model's method for cost recovery for the FIT policy. When enabled through the 'FIT
Recovery Switch', it adds a charge to the overall rate that
increases revenue for the utility and can offset the FIT
payments to the DG owners. For analysis in this paper, the
Rider is not used because it hides the cost of the FIT and
its set value is a debatable quantity.

The EE savings calculations are not included in the 'Annual
Energy Sales' variable. The required reduction from the EE
strategy comes from the Customer Power module calculations
by the amount of power sold by the utility 'Power Flow from
Utility' that is reduced by EE. The FIT produced power is
added into the 'Hourly Electric Sales' because it becomes
another generation source for the utility and is sold to
all customers on the grid at normal rates. The 'Accumulated
Effic Savings' and 'Customer Revenue from DG' are tracking

116
their respective variable totals for analysis. These values
are not shared by the whole residential customer class but
only benefit those that implement EE or install the DG under the FIT agreement.

Figure 17 - Customer Economics module

The fifth and final module in the current version of the
model represents the behavior of the regulatory action on
the utility (Figure 18). The thesis model uses data from
Harrisonburg Electric, a municipally-owned electric utility. In Virginia, this means that it will not fall under
the auspices of the state regulator, the SCC. The regulatory function in the model will instead be representative
of the public discourse that might happen if the utility
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began to reap profits that its citizen-customers deem too
high. HEC's charter does not provide any government entity
oversight powers so public outcry would be the only external pressure to adjust rates. However, in the last meeting
with HEC, there was no concern that this module would have
any affect on policy or rates. HEC's efficiency and excess
capacity allows management to not be concerned with long
term planning greater than a few years which is the timeframe necessary for the module to take any effect. HEC only
had interest in the one year model.
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Figure 18 - Regulatory module

The Starting Point for the Simulation
As with any model, the user must acknowledge that the model
is only as valid as its structure and input data. Even with
these two pieces, the model still only represents the modeled system and cannot be thought of as an exact replacement for the real-world system. The goal of this thesis and
the associated model is to create a tool that utility operators can use to view possible outcomes for their sales
and profit with the application of the four chosen strategies. This tool is not meant to give precise measurement of
these parameters but to show comparison between 'business
as usual' practices and changes that include the TOU, FIT/
DG, and EE policies separately and in combination.

The author, through interviews with an HEC executive, created this model by starting with the Baseline model. This
model included data from HEC that was then used to verify
model structure. When the output of the model agreed with
actual results from HEC and the cost and sales structures
were validated, the author then modified the model by adding structure and exogenous variables that allowed for the
new strategies to be tested. Each strategy was tested separately by (1.) allowing HEC to acknowledge its structure
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and then (2.) analyzing the output for veracity and effect
on the costs, power quantities, and sales of electricity.
Because no person involved with this project had extensive
knowledge of these effects, they could be only (3.) checked
for practical soundness. In other words, do the results
make sense? In all cases, model structure was changed until
these three criteria were satisfied.

The appendix at the end of this paper lists every exogenous
variable used in the model. Along with a brief description
of its purpose or meaning, there is a reference to the
source of the value that was actually used. However there
are a few variables that need to be mentioned in this section so the reader can have a basic understanding of the
model and its results.

• The first important note is that for the purposes of
this model, one year is calculated as 12 months times 30
days times 24 hours. This in effect shortens the year by
120 hours or 5 days which represents 1.4% of a year but
this simplification makes the structure of the model for
tracking these variables much simpler. It also makes implementing the seasonal data simpler.
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• The seasonal load data was provided by HEC and is real
data from 2010 and 2011. HEC records its total load
every hour along with other information that is important to its operations. This data was provided to the
author in the form of computer line-printer outputs.

• All data associated with HEC's purchase of power, operating their standby generators, and normal rate structure came directly from an HEC representative.

• For the Time-of-Use rates, the author attempted to use
to use Dominion Virginia Power as a source. Their rates
have no shoulder or off-season months. All months are
categorized as either winter or summer and this form was
originally implemented. When the trial runs began, it
became obvious that these rates would be detrimental to
HEC's gross profit. Understanding the corporate strategy
behind TOU rates and how they are designed is hard to
rationalize between individual utilities so it is difficult to know in what form the rates should be. The
author switched to the Alabama Power rates hoping to see
some better outcomes for HEC. The model structure was
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changed to add the 'TOU Rate Off Season' to accommodate
this additional part of the rate.

• In the peak shifting portion of the model that augments
the TOU, there are several implementations that were
considered. Utility scaled projects such as pumpedstorage did not fit this application. There are batterybased systems that can store large amounts of energy and
then be allowed to discharge back onto the grid during
peak demand. An all-electric car could also serve this
purpose. However, for the simplicity and cost requirements that HEC seemed to desire, a parallel water heater
system is applied to the model. The way it would function in practice is that when the model detects a trough
during the day it turns on the parallel heater to make
sure it is full of hot water. This would usually be during the middle of the night and the unit would not be
able to be turned on at any other time. When the model
detects a peak then a controller would turn off the
original water heater so it could not add to the peak
load and the homeowner would be able to draw hot water
from both tanks without a loss in capacity. This method
of implementation would be the least expensive of those
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considered. The only drawback is that this method would
work during the highest peaks in the winter but might
not be as effective in the summer. Further study would
have to be conducted to determine the contribution that
water heaters provide to the peak load during the summer
months.

• For the Feed-in Tariff, there were three policies in
North America that were considered; The Gainesville, FL
FIT, the FIT in Ontario Canada and the state-wide FIT in
Vermont. Vermont was chosen because the author felt the
environmental factors were similar and also because the
Vermont FIT had rates for DG sources other than solar
photovoltaics. The Vermont FIT is still relatively new
so there has been little analysis of its success. However, the program was modeled after programs in Europe
that have show great success in increasing the installations of renewable energy and reducing their overall installation costs.

• For the Demand-side Energy Efficiency, the main implementations that have been used are, in the view of the
author, the best representation of possible solutions.
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As discussed in the EE section of this paper, there are
two types of EE. One is energy conservation which is the
behavioral modifications that allow someone to use less
energy. Examples are combining car trips to save gasoline or turning out the light when you leave the room.
The second is actual improvement in efficiency by implementing physical changes to lower the consumption of energy to achieve the same task. Examples would be using
more efficient lighting or driving a compact car instead
of a SUV. The first is of interest in the model over the
longer time frame. The second is of more interest in the
short term. Because HEC's interest is short term at this
time, the physical method is what is implemented. Three
representations are used; using ground-source heat
pumps, using a highly efficient, heat pump water heater,
and using LED lighting in the home. All of these are viable alternatives that are available to homeowners today.

All of these elements allow the modeler to run the model
and provide useful output to the client, Harrisonburg Electric Commission, without providing for unlimited choice in
input parameters.
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Answering the Questions
1. How might combinations of the strategies of Time of Use
pricing, Feed-In-Tariffs, Distributed Generation, and Energy Efficiency affect HEC costs, customer electric bills,
and overall electrical consumption in the HEC residential
class customer base?
From the scenarios shown above in Table 1, it is apparent
that the different strategies affect the metrics (profit,
electrical consumption, etc.) by the same quantities if activated during any run of the model. There is very little
interaction between the strategies. Only when a combination
of strategies that reduced HEC CP charges (the peak demand
charge from Dominion) and lowered the amount of electricity
sold, did a cumulative effect appear.

Peak shifting

TOU-no
shifting

TOU w/
peak shifting

FIT(1)

EE (2)

EE (3)

Peak Shifting
& EE

Peak Shifting, TOU, EE

EE, FIT

ALL

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11
$360,364

$4,925,424

$1,128,911

$6,193,653

$5,693,972

$5,425,826

$5,047,824

$1,155,961

$823,201

$6,316,053

$5,816,371

Utility Gross
Profit

$14,053,084

$14,550,394

$13,284,536

$13,284,536

$13,781,846

$13,219,370

$14,807,145

$13,541,287

$14,038,597

$13,541,287

$14,413,447

$19,475,818

$14,413,447

$19,478,189

$19,475,818

$18,645,195

$19,854,968

$14,697,248

$14,861,798

$19,857,340

$19,854,968

(customer bill)

Costs
$14,038,597

Utility Annual
Energy Sales

Utility Annual Energy

209,351,690

Total Electricity
Consumption

209,351,690

$357,181 209,351,690

0

$357,181 209,351,690

0

Annual
Strategy
Costs

205,353,910

196,595,787

$357,181 205,353,910

$357,181 205,353,910

0

0

$1,152,219 $1,275,181 205,353,910

$1,152,219 $918,000 205,353,910

0

0

0

0

$1,152,219 $918,000 209,351,690

0

0

0

0

DG Energy
Costs

4,800,914

4,800,914

0

0

0

0

4,800,914

0

0

0

0

DG kWh
Produced

$283,821

$379.189

$283,821

$379,189

$379,189

$1,209,897

0

0

0

$0

$0

$117,584

$117,584

$117,584

$117,584

$117,584

$1,816,263

0

0

0

$0

$0

Annual Sav- Annual Cost of EE
ings from EE

1. This FIT implementation uses only PV and includes no FIT recovery mechanism for the utility.
2. All three EE implementations were used.
3. Only LED lighting was implemented.

Table 1- Results from Model Runs
Notes

None

1

Strategies
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Figure 19- Consumption Data for Run number 2 which only includes the Peak Shifting for HEC (1 month)

The graph in Figure 19 shows where the load is shifted at
its peaks and troughs during Run #2. The blue that shows
through at the top of a curve is where customer consumption
remains the same but that the amount of energy sold by HEC
is reduced. This difference comes from energy being withdrawn from storage that HEC bought from its supplier during
an off-peak or trough in demand. Where the blue shows
through at a trough is where HEC is buying more KW than the
customers are using because this extra power is going into
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some form of storage. Notice the largest peak at about time
560 is reduced by this strategy. The net effect is the significant reduction in HEC's CP demand charge for this
month.

Figure 20- Consumption Data for Run number 5 which only includes FIT from photovoltaics (1 month)

The graph in Figure 20 also shows where the load is shifted
at its peaks but not at the troughs in Run #5. During this
run the peak shifting is coming from the PV generation
which tends to produce more power during HEC's peak hours.
This graph is using data for January so the PV shift at 560
is slightly later than the same time period in Figure 19
because the peak hour is 8:00am in the morning. The PV does
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not start producing at its peak until mid to late morning
as indicated in the lower pink line on the graph at the
peak at time 560 through 565. These hours coincide with
8:00am through 1:00pm on the 24rd day of the month. HEC's CP
hour was 8:00am on that day when this data was recorded.
Because there is no benefit at 8:00am, there is no benefit
to HEC as there would be at a utility that might be able to
run less peak generation.

Figure 21- Annual Gross Profit for Run 1 through 7
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Figure 22- Annual Gross Profit from Runs 1 and Runs 8
through 10 (2,3,4,5 on graph)

The graphs in Figures 21 and 22 show how HEC's profit accumulates over one year from monthly billings. The cause for
the sawtooth shape in the graphs is the CP charge that significantly lowers profit as it is calculated at the end of
each month. The profit climbs as sales accumulate and then
when the CP demand charge is calculated at the beginning of
the next month, the profit takes a drop. The lower data
lines on both graphs are a result of the TOU rates being
implemented. This drastic effect on profits was a surprise
to HEC and to the author. The common wisdom is that TOU
rates are detrimental to the customer but this shows dif-
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ferently. By analyzing the graphs, one can see that the
rates are only good for HEC during the months June through
September (hours 3600 through 6480). This effect can be accounted for by the larger load swings between peak and
trough during the day for these months which allow HEC to
earn more money at the peak rate than during other times of
the year. In other words, HEC's daily load has a greater
differential during the summer months. The percent difference between a peak and a trough during the summer months
is greater than the winter months and much greater than the
shoulder months of April, May, October, and November. The
cause is most likely due to the increase use of air conditioning during the summer months which is a large portion
of the total residential consumption during the summer.

2. Which one of the combinations from question number 1
provides the best outcome for the profitability of the
utility?

As shown in Table 1, Peak shifting without TOU rates (run
number 2) will not affect the customer bill and give HEC
the highest profitability increase. The model projects an
increase in annual profit of $499,682 which represents an
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increase of 8.6%. This is due to the fact that the Coincident Peak demand charge is a significant portion of the
utility's costs. Any reduction in Peak Demand will positively affect HEC's profitability. All other scenarios reduce this increase in profit by either reducing total sales
of electricity or adding to the cost of the electricity
sold by HEC.

3. Which one of the combinations from question number 1
provides the best outcome for the saving of the most energy?

The only strategy that actually reduces consumption, as
discussed earlier and shown in Figure 8, is the EE strategy. The model run number 6 reduces Total Consumption the
most. Run number 7 also reduces Total Consumption but not
as much. The difference between # 6 and #7 is that the annual cost to implement the EE with all three implementations (run # 6) is more than the actual electricity cost
savings based upon the current normal rate from HEC. Because of this cost, run #6 will not be considered viable.
Run #7 provides the best outcome for saving the most energy
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and saves approximately 4,000,000 kWh which amounts to a
1.9% savings in consumed electricity.

The model provides for calculation of an 'adoption rate' of
the EE strategy based upon payback or return on investment.
The curve determining the adoption rate is an S-shaped
growth pattern that can vary between 6.5% and 83% with a
beginning value of 16% of the whole residential customer
class for HEC.

The input range is based upon simple as-

sumptions of early adoption and actual market potential.
The values are meant for comparison purposes only and would
have to be refined through market research to be more accurate. The calculation is updated at the end of every year
so with HEC's lack of interest in multi-year analysis at
this point, there was no further refinement made. However,
the adoption rate would affect the extent of the potential
savings from EE since the costs and savings have a linear
relationship to number of adopters. In other words, a
greater payback would entice a higher adoption rate and result in higher reductions in electricity consumption for
the HEC residential market.
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Another viewpoint can also be considered for this question.
Based upon previous discussion of energy policy, our country's goal is to have electricity that is cheap, secure,
and clean. If moving away from fossil-fuel based generation
allows the policy goals to be met, then perhaps including
electricity that comes from low-carbon or no-carbon sources
can be considered a similar outcome to saving energy. Renewable energy by definition means that the source has no
external inputs that deplete over time which is the reason
society wants to 'save energy'. If this logic is sound then
using the renewable DG sources can also contribute to 'saving energy' by not using a resource which can be depleted
such as coal and natural gas. In this case, run number 10
shows the amount of electricity that is saved from EE and
further saved from the amount that comes from FIT/DG that
is based upon solar photovoltaics. This run indicates a total savings of approximately 8,800,000 kWh or 4.2% savings
from run number 1 which represents 'business as usual'.
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4. What changes in the regulatory environment would improve
the prospects for adopting these policies?

Although HEC has no regulatory obligations, it is worthy to
discuss how these strategies might affect regulatory policy
for other utilities since the model is designed to serve
other regions and utilities too. A Feed-in Tariff is normally a regulatory policy that could help HEC by lowering
peak demand costs. A problem arises from the utility having
to absorb the cost of these payments. FIT costs, the amount
paid to the owners of the DG, would have to be recovered in
some way to make it viable to the utilities.

Some FIT

plans have tried to recover costs through a tax vehicle but
because taxes are political in nature, this method has a
high failure rate

[10].

Other FIT programs add a charge to

the customers' bills. This extra charge could be split
evenly across all customers as a fixed fee or it could be
in the form of a per kWh rider. The application of the
rider could protect certain types of customers such as intensive users of electricity like heavy industry or the
rider could be restricted from low income customers

[56].

The

idea is to promote the DG that the FIT pays for but spread
the new cost over a larger group. These rate policies would
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have to implemented through some form of regulatory body.
For HEC, that would be its board of Commissioners. For
other utilities such as Dominion Virginia Power, that
authority would be the State Corporation Commission.

FIT

plans have been proposed at the local, state, and even federal level in the past but have had little success. Having
a more flexible regulatory environment and progressive political climate would help FITs to be implemented.

Another recurring issue for DG and its implementation is
the problem with power islanding. This problem occurs when
a grid connected generating source such as solar PV continues to produce electricity after the rest of the grid as
failed. This failure may come from storm damage or from
utility work that requires removing power from distribution
lines. The utility is concerned for the safety of its personnel as well as damage to its equipment from the errant
PV source. With the advent of advanced power electronics,
this threat is easily addressed. The problem lies with the
regulatory and other oversight bodies that set standards
for the industry. They have been slow to adopt changes that
require these new capabilities. Currently, there are proposed changes to the two main standards in this area. They
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are sections of the IEEE 1547 and UL 1741 standards that
address the issues associated with islanded power sources
so DG can serve as standby power and continue to operate
after the rest of the grid has failed. The bodies that
adopt and enforce these standards need to move as quickly
as possible to allow for the expansion of FIT/DG policies.

The last potential influence that regulators can have on
these strategies is in the area of Energy Efficiency implementation. By allowing or requesting utilities to promote
these measures, the regulators can accelerate their adoption. There are incentives that utilities have been given
to implement EE policies with their customers. These come
in form of tax breaks or credits and must be approved by
legislative bodies which are certainly regulatory bodies.
As with the FIT policy, a more progressive political climate will be necessary to widely implement these type of
incentives. Otherwise, implementation of EE will take much
longer as we wait for better product and cheaper costs.

Conclusions
The concluding thoughts for this paper relate to the lessons learned and what further action might be taken to enhance the model and create a more useful tool for its intended user audience.

This paper is a culmination of hundreds of hours of research and modeling effort. The author is convinced that
there is little disagreement about the challenges ahead for
the electricity sector of the energy future in the U.S. The
difficulty lies in the debate on how to solve them. Hopefully this thesis has addressed a portion of this debate
and pointed to the utilities as being the key stakeholder
in making meaningful changes. Through the simulations and
conversation with HEC, this thesis has shown that there are
possible strategies that can be implemented to help meet
the new energy policy goals of cheap, secure, and clean.

Although this thesis represents a great deal of work, the
project is still not complete. There are several areas that
need further attention and study.
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First and foremost, it is important to expand the time
scale of this analysis to see multiyear behavior of the
stakeholders. Many human behaviors cannot be studied on a
scale of less than one year. The adoption of technology,
the acceptance of new ideas, and the changing of how people
behave all take years to measure. Although the longer term
dynamics did not have immediate interest to the client,
knowing or at least trying to understand possible outcomes
of new strategies has to make sense to any business. Understanding the give and take of the regulatory process is
also important to many of the potential users of this simulator. The current model is built to accept these new feedbacks and has already included some. However, due to the
size and complex nature of the model it might be more practical to build a more aggregated (having less detail) model
with just corporate and consumer behaviors accounted for
and fewer measurable quantities such as the hourly load
data used in this model. A more aggregated model would simplify the structure and show the new, long-term behaviors
more clearly. It might not be necessary to see the interaction of the human behaviors with electricity metrics to the
detailed perspective that this paper's model provides.
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The other area where the model could be augmented and improved would be in the market dynamics of the pricing of
the strategies. The stated goal of a FIT is to create a
market for renewable energy so that economies of scale may
be realized. Currently there is no feedback or other mechanism that deals with this dynamic. It may be instructive to
include a mechanism to alter the capital cost of the strategy as market penetration grows. This effect has been well
documented in the successful implementation of FIT's around
the globe[10]. This mechanism could also be applied to the EE
strategies. LED lighting prices have dropped significantly
over the past 10 years because of greater market size which
leads to new research and development for better efficiencies and greater market competition over time.

An area that needs further analysis is in the introduction
of Time-of-Use rates for HEC. As stated earlier, it is common understanding that TOU is beneficial for utilities and
difficult for homeowners to use for their advantage. In the
case of HEC, the load data used in the model is the utility's total load that is rationed by customer class. It may
be found that the load data shape (size of peaks and
troughs) for all customer classes is different than the
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shape for just the residential class. In other words, the
total loads may have different percent load changes during
the day than the residential class. There are other customer classes that might contribute greatly to the overnight loads such as street lights or industrial users that
would cover up the significant drops in residential
troughs. If this is in fact the case, then the residential
swings might be greater than modeled and the TOU rates
would have a greater detrimental effect on the residential
customer class leading to a better scenario for HEC.

The last comment is an invitation. There are many topics
discussed in this paper and the author recognizes that the
reader may have expertise that can shed additional light on
the strategies and models developed here. If the reader has
suggestions for model improvements, please contact the
author, Brooks E Taylor at TaylorBE@Dukes.JMU.edu.

Hopefully you have gleaned some new insight or even have
formed new ideas about the problems presented and their
possible solutions. That, of course, is the major goal of
the work.
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Respectfully submitted,

Brooks E Taylor
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Appendix A - Exogenous Variables

Price paid to DG owners for energy produced from CHP DG
Switch to turn on/off FIT recovery strategy
Price added to customer bills to
recover the payout to FIT/DG
owners
Adder to customer bills to adjust
for market fluctuations of fuel
used to generate electricity
Installation cost for HVAC EE
strategy divided by number of
years of expected service
Installation cost for lighting EE
strategy divided by number of
years of expected service
Base electricity price to residential customer
Price paid to DG owners for energy from solar DG
Table data for TOU rate structure in off-season
Table data for TOU rate structure during summer months

CHP FIT

FIT Recovery Switch

FIT Rider

Fuel Adjustment

HVAC Cost Per Watt Per
Yr

Lighting Cost Per Watt
Per Yr

Normal Rate Price

Solar FIT

TOU Rate Off Season

TOU Rate Summer

Customer
Economics
(CE)

Brief Description

Variable Name

Module

$/kWh

-

$/kWh

units

$/watt/yr

$/watt/yr

see
model

see
model

$0.240

$/KWh

$/KWh

$/kWh

$0.07762 $/kWh

$0.2520

$516.66

$0.01723 $/kWh

$0.0055

0

$0.1359

Initial
Value

{2012, #1164}

{2012, #1164}

{Lamont, 2011, #1176}

HEC

{, #90731}

{Lienau et al., 1995, #1171}

HEC

author

-

{Lamont, 2011, #1176}

Source
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Price paid to DG owners for energy produced from CHP DG
Switch to turn on/off FIT recovery
strategy
Price added to customer bills to
recover the payout to FIT/DG
owners
Adder to customer bills to adjust
for market fluctuations of fuel
used to generate electricity
Installation cost for HVAC EE
strategy divided by number of
years of expected service
Installation cost for lighting EE
strategy divided by number of
years of expected service
Base electricity price to residential customer
Price paid to DG owners for energy from solar DG
Table data for TOU rate structure
in off-season
Table data for TOU rate structure
during summer months

CHP FIT

FIT Recovery Switch

FIT Rider

Fuel Adjustment

HVAC Cost Per Watt Per
Yr

Lighting Cost Per Watt Per
Yr

Normal Rate Price

Solar FIT

TOU Rate Off Season

TOU Rate Summer

Customer
Economics
(CE)

Brief Description

Variable Name

Module

see
model

see
model

$0.240

$0.07762

$0.2520

$516.66

$0.01723

$0.0055

0

$0.1359

Initial
Value

$/KWh

$/KWh

$/KWh

$/KWh

$/watt/yr

$/watt/yr

$/KWh

$/KWh

-

$/KWh

units

{2012, #1164}

{2012, #1164}

{Lamont, 2011, #1176}

HEC

{, #90731}

{Lienau et al., 1995, #1171}

HEC

author

-

{Lamont, 2011, #1176}

Source
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Customer
Power (CP)
Average percent of annual output
capacity of CHP strategy
Switch to turn on/off HVAC EE
strategy
Switch to turn on/off HVAC EE
strategy
Percent of residential customers
that adopt Solar strategy
Percent of residential customers
that adopt CHP strategy
Percent of residential customers
that adopt Wind strategy
Total number of residential customers

CHP Switch

DG Switch

Pct CHP Adoption

Pct Solar Adoption

Pct Wind Adoption

Residential Customers

Price paid to DG owners for energy produced from wind DG

Wind FIT

CHP Percent Output

Installation cost for water heater
EE strategy divided by number of
years of expected service

Water Htr Cost Per Watt
Per Yr

Installed capacity of each CHP
microturbine

Switch to turn on/off HVAC EE
strategy

TOU Switch

CHP Capacity

Table data for TOU rate structure
during winter months

TOU Rate Winter

17,000

0

5

0

0

0

90

30

$0.2083

$128

0

see
model

accounts

%

%

%

-

-

%

KW

$/KWh

$/watt/yr

-

$/KWh

HEC

author

author

author

-

-

{2010, #1179}

author

{Lamont, 2011, #1176}

{Dubay et al., 2009, #1173}

-

{2012, #1164}
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Load Data
(LD)
Amount of Power that can be
shifted at once for peak shifting
Table of data for hourly percentages of the residential load that is
from lighting
Number of years before EE strategy starts
Switch to turn on/off ALL EE
strategies
Percent reduction of HVAC load
due to efficiency strategy
Switch to turn on/off HVAC EE
strategy
Total load date representative of
winter months

Avg Percent Lighting

Effic Delay

Efficiency Switch

HVAC Efficiency Improvement

HVAC Switch

Jan Hourly Demand Curve

Switch to turn on/off HVAC EE
strategy

Wind Switch

Amount Shifted

Hourly output from wind turbine of
typical day in Roanoke VA

Wind Power Output

Total load date representative of
spring shoulder months

Switch to turn on/off HVAC EE
strategy

Solar Switch

April Hourly Demand
Curve

Hourly output from PV of typical
day in Roanoke VA

Solar Power Output

see
model

0

31

0

0

14% for
hours 124

5000

see
model

0

see
model

0

see
model

KW

-

%

-

years

%

KW

KW

-

watts

-

watts

HEC

-

{Lienau et al., 1995, #1171}

-

-

{, #34861}

author

HEC

-

{, #21242}{2012, #1181}

-

{, #16375}
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Total load date representative of
summer months
Percent reduction of lighting load
due to efficiency strategy
Switch to turn on/off Lighting EE
strategy
Total load date representative of
fall shoulder months
Percent of a peak demand running average that causes the
stored capacity to be released
Percentage of the residential load
that is due to HVAC equipment
Percentage of the residential load
that is due to the electric water
heater
Table data that provide the
monthly percentage of the total
utility load that is residential
Overall efficiency of Peak Storage after it is stored and returned
to use
Switch to turn on/off HVAC EE
strategy
Total storage capacity available
for Peak Shifting

June Hourly Demand
Curve

Lighting Efficiency Improvement

Lighting Switch

October Hourly Demand
Curve

Peak Range %

Percent HVAC

Percent Water Htr

Residential %

Roundtrip Efficiency

Shifted Load Switch

Storage Capacity kWh

20,000

0

100

see
model

20

49

0

see
model

0

88

see
model

KWh

-

%

%

%

%

%

KW

-

%

KW

author

-

author

HEC

{2011, #1174}

{2011, #1174}

author

HEC

-

{, #90731}

HEC
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Installed costs for wind turbine
system

Wind System Costs

CP Price

Installed costs for PV solar strategy

Solar System Costs

Utility Economics
(UE)

Installed costs of the Peak Shifting Strategy

Shifted Load Storage
Costs

Contract power purchase price

Comparative Value for regulating
utility profit

Annual Costs to operate and
maintain a microturbine

CHP System Operating
Costs

Allowed Gross Profit

Total Installed Cost of a CHP microturbine

Switch to turn on/off HVAC EE
strategy

Water Htr Switch

CHP Install Cost

Percent reduction of water heater
load due to efficiency strategy

Water Htr Efficiency Improvement

Regulatory
(Reg)

Strategy
Costs (SC)

Percent of trough running average that causes the stored capacity to be charged

Trough Range %

$0.04

30

$1,000

$0.24

$17.09

$0.0250

$3,000

0

59

20

$/KWh

%

$/yr

$/watt/yr

$/KW/yr

$/KWh

$/KW/yr

-

%

%

HEC

author

{, #34634}

{Barbose et al., 2011, #1185}

author

{McAvoy, 2011, #1188; Pierce P E,
2005, #1187}

{McAvoy, 2011, #1188; Pierce P E,
2005, #1187}

-

{Dubay et al., 2009, #1173}

author
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Appendix B - Model Variables and Equations

INFLOWS:

Actual_Nonadjusted_Peak_Demand_Picker(t) = Actual_Nonadjusted_Peak_Demand_Picker(t - dt) + (Store_2 - Erase_2)
* dt
INIT Actual_Nonadjusted_Peak_Demand_Picker = 0

Erase = IF (MOD(TIME,720)=0) THEN Actual_Adjusted_Monthly_Peak_Demand_Picker ELSE (IF
(LD.Customer_Consumption_Data>Actual_Nonadjusted_Peak_Demand_Picker) THEN
Actual_Adjusted_Monthly_Peak_Demand_Picker ELSE 0)

OUTFLOWS:

Store = IF (MOD(TIME,720)=0) THEN 0 ELSE (IF (LD.Customer_Consumption_Data>
Actual_Nonadjusted_Peak_Demand_Picker) THEN Power_Flow_from_Utility ELSE 0)

INFLOWS:

Actual_Adjusted_Monthly_Peak_Demand_Picker(t) = Actual_Adjusted_Monthly_Peak_Demand_Picker(t - dt) + (Store Erase) * dt
INIT Actual_Adjusted_Monthly_Peak_Demand_Picker = 0

Annual_Reset_4 = IF (MOD(TIME,8640)=0) THEN Past_Annual_Sales ELSE 0

INFLOWS:

Accumulated_Energy_Sales(t) = Accumulated_Energy_Sales(t - dt) + (Annual_Reset_4) * dt
INIT Accumulated_Energy_Sales = 0

Annual_Accounting = IF (MOD(TIME,8640)=0) THEN Utility_Gross_Profit ELSE 0

INFLOWS:

Accumulated_Earnings(t) = Accumulated_Earnings(t - dt) + (Annual_Accounting) * dt
INIT Accumulated_Earnings = 0

Annual_Reset_6 = IF (MOD(TIME,8641)=0) THEN Accum_Effic_Savings ELSE 0

OUTFLOWS:

Cost_Reduction_From_Effic = Actual_Electricity_Rate*LD.Efficiency_Load_Reduction

INFLOWS:

Accum_Effic_Savings(t) = Accum_Effic_Savings(t - dt) + (Cost_Reduction_From_Effic - Annual_Reset_6) * dt
INIT Accum_Effic_Savings = 0
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Customer_Costs_for_Effic(t) = Customer_Costs_for_Effic(t - dt) + (Customer_Costs_per_Year_for_Strategies Annual_Reset_5) * dt
INIT Customer_Costs_for_Effic = 0

Annual_Reset = IF (MOD(TIME,8640)=0) THEN Annual_Utility_Energy_Costs ELSE 0

OUTFLOWS:

DG_Costs = CE.Distributed_Generation_Revenue

Monthly_Coincident_Peak_Charge = IF (MOD(TIME,720)=0) THEN
((CP.Actual_Adjusted_Monthly_Peak_Demand_Picker*Coincident_Peak_Demand_Price)+
Fixed_Cost_Adjustment_Calculation) ELSE 0

Peak_Turbine_Cost = PT_Price*UP.Peak_Turbine_Production

Peak_Diesel_Cost = PD_Price*UP.Diesel_Peak_Production

Contract_Power = CP_Price*UP.Contract_Power_Supply

INFLOWS:

Annual_Utility_Energy_Costs(t) = Annual_Utility_Energy_Costs(t - dt) + (Contract_Power + Peak_Diesel_Cost +
Peak_Turbine_Cost + Monthly_Coincident_Peak_Charge + DG_Costs - Annual_Reset) * dt
INIT Annual_Utility_Energy_Costs = .1

Annual_Reset_3 = IF (MOD(TIME,8640)=0) THEN Annual_Energy_Sales ELSE 0

OUTFLOWS:

Hourly_Electricity_Sales = Actual_Electricity_Rate*(CP.Power_Flow_from_Utility+
CP.Distributed_Generation_Rate)

INFLOWS:

Annual_Energy_Sales(t) = Annual_Energy_Sales(t - dt) + (Hourly_Electricity_Sales - Annual_Reset_3) * dt
INIT Annual_Energy_Sales = .1

Erase_2 = IF (MOD(TIME,720)=0) THEN Actual_Nonadjusted_Peak_Demand_Picker ELSE (IF
(LD.Customer_Consumption_Data>Actual_Nonadjusted_Peak_Demand_Picker) THEN
Actual_Nonadjusted_Peak_Demand_Picker ELSE 0)

OUTFLOWS:

Store_2 = IF (MOD(TIME,720)=0) THEN 0 ELSE (IF (LD.Customer_Consumption_Data>
Actual_Nonadjusted_Peak_Demand_Picker) THEN LD.Customer_Consumption_Data ELSE 0)
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Erase_3 = IF (MOD(TIME,24)=0) THEN 0 ELSE (IF (Customer_Consumption_Data<Daily_Trough_Picker) THEN
Daily_Trough_Picker ELSE 0)

Push_a_Trough = IF (MOD(TIME,24)=0) THEN Daily_Trough_Picker ELSE 0

OUTFLOWS:

Store_3 = IF (MOD(TIME,24)=0) THEN Customer_Consumption_Data ELSE (IF (Customer_Consumption_Data<
Daily_Trough_Picker) THEN Customer_Consumption_Data ELSE 0)

INFLOWS:

Daily_Trough_Picker(t) = Daily_Trough_Picker(t - dt) + (Store_3 - Push_a_Trough - Erase_3) * dt
INIT Daily_Trough_Picker = Customer_Consumption_Data

Erase_2 = IF (Customer_Consumption_Data>Daily_Peak_Demand_Picker) THEN Daily_Peak_Demand_Picker ELSE 0

Push_a_Peak = IF (MOD(TIME,24)=0) THEN Daily_Peak_Demand_Picker ELSE 0

OUTFLOWS:

Store_2 = IF (MOD(TIME,720)=0) THEN 0 ELSE (IF (Customer_Consumption_Data>Daily_Peak_Demand_Picker)
THEN Customer_Consumption_Data ELSE 0)

INFLOWS:

Daily_Peak_Demand_Picker(t) = Daily_Peak_Demand_Picker(t - dt) + (Store_2 - Push_a_Peak - Erase_2) * dt
INIT Daily_Peak_Demand_Picker = 0

Distributed_Generation_Revenue = CP.DG_Switch*((CP.CHP_Gen*LOOKUP(CHP_FIT,INT(TIME/8640)))+
(CP.Wind_Gen*LOOKUP(Wind_FIT,INT(TIME/8640)))+(CP.Solar_Gen*LOOKUP(Solar_FIT,INT(TIME/8640))))

INFLOWS:

Customer_Revenue_from_DG(t) = Customer_Revenue_from_DG(t - dt) + (Distributed_Generation_Revenue) * dt
INIT Customer_Revenue_from_DG = 0

Annual_Reset_5 = IF (MOD(TIME,8641)=0) THEN Customer_Costs_for_Effic ELSE 0

OUTFLOWS:

Customer_Costs_per_Year_for_Strategies = IF (MOD(TIME,8640)=0) THEN (LD.Efficiency_Control*
((((Water_Htr_Cost_Per_House_Per_Yr*LD.Wtr_Htr_Switch)+(HVAC_Cost_Per_House_Per_Yr*
LD.HVAC_Switch))*CP.Residential_Customers)+(Lighting_Cost_Per_Watt_Per_Yr*LD.Lighting_Loads*1000))*
LD.Adoption_Rate/100) ELSE 0

INFLOWS:
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OUTFLOWS:

Push_a_Trough = IF (MOD(TIME,24)=0) THEN Daily_Trough_Picker ELSE 0

INFLOWS:

Seven_Days_of_Troughs(t) = Seven_Days_of_Troughs(t - dt) + (Push_a_Trough - Drop_a_Trough) * dt
INIT Seven_Days_of_Troughs = 0
!TRANSIT TIME = 168
!INFLOW LIMIT = ∞
!CAPACITY = ∞

Drop_a_Peak = CONVEYOR OUTFLOW

OUTFLOWS:

Push_a_Peak = IF (MOD(TIME,24)=0) THEN Daily_Peak_Demand_Picker ELSE 0

INFLOWS:

Seven_Days_of_Peak(t) = Seven_Days_of_Peak(t - dt) + (Push_a_Peak - Drop_a_Peak) * dt
INIT Seven_Days_of_Peak = 0
!TRANSIT TIME = 168
!INFLOW LIMIT = ∞
!CAPACITY = ∞

Annual_Reset_4 = IF (MOD(TIME,8640)=0) THEN Past_Annual_Sales ELSE 0

OUTFLOWS:

Annual_Reset_3 = IF (MOD(TIME,8640)=0) THEN Annual_Energy_Sales ELSE 0

INFLOWS:

Past_Annual_Sales(t) = Past_Annual_Sales(t - dt) + (Annual_Reset_3 - Annual_Reset_4) * dt
INIT Past_Annual_Sales = .001

Annual_Reset_II = IF (MOD(TIME,8640)=0) THEN Past_Annual_Cost ELSE 0

OUTFLOWS:

Annual_Reset = IF (MOD(TIME,8640)=0) THEN Annual_Utility_Energy_Costs ELSE 0

INFLOWS:

Past_Annual_Cost(t) = Past_Annual_Cost(t - dt) + (Annual_Reset - Annual_Reset_II) * dt
INIT Past_Annual_Cost = 0
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INFLOWS:

Total_Demand(t) = Total_Demand(t - dt) + (Contract_Power_Supply + Diesel_Peak_Production +
Peak_Turbine_Production - Consumption_Flow) * dt
INIT Total_Demand = 0

Distributed_Generation_Rate = Total_DG_Rate

LD.ToFrom_Storage = IF (Shifted_Load_Switch=1) THEN (IF(Customer_Consumption_Data<((1+(Trough_Range_%/
100))*Seven_Days_of_Troughs/7) AND (Shifted_Load_Storage<Storage_Capacity_kwh)) THEN (-1*
Amount_Shifted) ELSE IF (Customer_Consumption_Data>((1-(Peak_Range_%/100))*Seven_Days_of_Peak/7))
THEN (Amount_Shifted*(Roundtrip_Efficiency/100)) ELSE 0) ELSE 0

Power_Flow_from_Utility = LD.Customer_Consumption_Data-LD.ToFrom_Storage-Distributed_Generation_Rate

INFLOWS:

Total_Consumption_kwh(t) = Total_Consumption_kwh(t - dt) + (Power_Flow_from_Utility + LD.ToFrom_Storage +
Distributed_Generation_Rate) * dt
INIT Total_Consumption_kwh = 0

Strategy_Savings = 0

OUTFLOWS:

Strategy_Costs = IF (MOD(TIME,8640)=0) THEN (SC.Utility_Costs_Per_Year_For_Strategies) ELSE 0

INFLOWS:

Strategy_Investment(t) = Strategy_Investment(t - dt) + (Strategy_Costs - Strategy_Savings) * dt
INIT Strategy_Investment = 0

Storage_Loss = If (ToFrom_Storage>0) THEN (Amount_Shifted-ToFrom_Storage) ELSE 0

ToFrom_Storage = IF (Shifted_Load_Switch=1) THEN (IF(Customer_Consumption_Data<((1+(Trough_Range_%/
100))*Seven_Days_of_Troughs/7) AND (Shifted_Load_Storage<Storage_Capacity_kwh)) THEN (-1*
Amount_Shifted) ELSE IF (Customer_Consumption_Data>((1-(Peak_Range_%/100))*Seven_Days_of_Peak/7))
THEN (Amount_Shifted*(Roundtrip_Efficiency/100)) ELSE 0) ELSE 0

OUTFLOWS:

Shifted_Load_Storage(t) = Shifted_Load_Storage(t - dt) + (- ToFrom_Storage - Storage_Loss) * dt
INIT Shifted_Load_Storage = 0

Drop_a_Trough = CONVEYOR OUTFLOW
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Appliance_Effic = Wtr_Htr_Loads*Water_Htr_Efficiency_Improvement/100

Amount_Shifted = 5000

Allowed_Gross_Profit = 30

Adoption_Rate = GRAPH(CE.Effic_Payback)
(0.00, 6.50), (0.2, 7.00), (0.4, 7.50), (0.6, 9.00), (0.8, 11.5), (1.00, 15.5), (1.20, 29.5), (1.40, 57.5), (1.60, 69.0),
(1.80, 78.5), (2.00, 83.5)

Actual_Electricity_Rate = IF (TOU_Switch=0) THEN (Normal_Rate_Price+Fuel_Adjustment+Rider) ELSE IF (LD.Month>=1
AND LD.Month<=3) THEN (LOOKUP(TOU_Rate_Winter,MOD(TIME,24)+Fuel_Adjustment+Rider)) ELSE IF (LD.Month>=4 AND
LD.Month<=5) THEN (LOOKUP(TOU_Rate_Off_Season,MOD(TIME,24)+Fuel_Adjustment+Rider)) ELSE IF (LD.Month>=6 AND
LD.Month<=9) THEN (LOOKUP(TOU_Rate_Summer,MOD(TIME,24)+Fuel_Adjustment+Rider)) ELSE IF (LD.Month=10) THEN
(LOOKUP(TOU_Rate_Off_Season,MOD(TIME,24)+Fuel_Adjustment+Rider)) ELSE
(LOOKUP(TOU_Rate_Winter,MOD(TIME,24)+Fuel_Adjustment+Rider))

Efficiency_Load_Reduction = Efficiency_Control*(((Lighting_Effic+HVAC_Effic+Appliance_Effic))*(Adoption_Rate/
100))

UNATTACHED:

Distributed_Generation_Rate = Total_DG_Rate

OUTFLOWS:

Total_DG_Produced(t) = Total_DG_Produced(t - dt) + (- Distributed_Generation_Rate) * dt
INIT Total_DG_Produced = 0

Consumption_Flow = CP.Power_Flow_from_Utility

OUTFLOWS:

Peak_Turbine_Production = LOOKUP(PT_Schedule,MOD(TIME,24))

Diesel_Peak_Production = LOOKUP(PD_Schedule,MOD(TIME,24))

Contract_Power_Supply = Consumption_Flow-Diesel_Peak_Production-Peak_Turbine_Production
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73.7),
93.4),
88.4),
71.3),
76.2),
68.3),

(4.00,
(13.0,
(22.0,
(31.0,
(40.0,
(49.0,

73.5),
92.0),
84.2),
74.4),
76.3),
65.7),

(5.00,
(14.0,
(23.0,
(32.0,
(41.0,
(50.0,

77.7), (6.00, 81.0), (7.00, 88.3), (8.00,
91.4), (15.0, 89.7), (16.0, 87.0), (17.0,
78.8), (24.0, 73.2), (25.0, 70.8), (26.0,
76.2), (33.0, 76.2), (34.0, 78.3), (35.0,
77.9), (42.0, 78.4), (43.0, 77.2), (44.0,
63.9), (51.0, 63.4), (52.0, 63.2)...

92.7),
85.1),
70.0),
80.2),
83.6),

Coincident_Peak_Demand_Price = 16.607

CHP_System_Operating_Costs = 0.035

CHP_Percent_Output = GRAPH(TIME)
(0.00, 90.0), (1.00, 90.0), (2.00, 90.0), (3.00, 90.0), (4.00, 90.0), (5.00, 90.0), (6.00, 90.0), (7.00, 90.0), (8.00, 90.0),
(9.00, 90.0), (10.0, 90.0), (11.0, 90.0), (12.0, 90.0), (13.0, 90.0), (14.0, 90.0), (15.0, 90.0), (16.0, 90.0), (17.0, 90.0),
(18.0, 90.0), (19.0, 90.0), (20.0, 90.0), (21.0, 90.0), (22.0, 90.0), (23.0, 90.0)

CHP_FIT = GRAPH(TIME)
(0.00, 0.136), (5.00, 0.136), (10.0, 0.136), (15.0, 0.136), (20.0, 0.1), (25.0, 0.1)

CHP_Switch = 0

CHP_Install_Cost = 9000.0

CHP_Gen = CHP_Switch*LOOKUP(CHP_Percent_Output,MOD(TIME,24))*(CHP_Capacity/100)*Residential_Customers*
(Pct_CHP_Adoption/100)

CHP_Capacity = 30.0

Avg_Percent_Lighting = GRAPH(TIME)
(0.00, 14.0), (1.00, 14.0), (2.00, 14.0), (3.00, 14.0), (4.00, 14.0), (5.00, 14.0), (6.00, 14.0), (7.00, 14.0), (8.00, 14.0),
(9.00, 14.0), (10.0, 14.0), (11.0, 14.0), (12.0, 14.0), (13.0, 14.0), (14.0, 14.0), (15.0, 14.0), (16.0, 14.0), (17.0, 14.0),
(18.0, 14.0), (19.0, 14.0), (20.0, 14.0), (21.0, 14.0), (22.0, 14.0), (23.0, 14.0)

April_Hourly_Demand_Curve = GRAPH(TIME)
(0.00, 76.0), (1.00, 76.0), (2.00, 74.8), (3.00,
(9.00, 95.7), (10.0, 95.7), (11.0, 91.9), (12.0,
(18.0, 84.4), (19.0, 83.9), (20.0, 89.7), (21.0,
(27.0, 67.5), (28.0, 68.4), (29.0, 68.6), (30.0,
(36.0, 78.7), (37.0, 79.2), (38.0, 78.0), (39.0,
(45.0, 80.2), (46.0, 76.1), (47.0, 72.1), (48.0,
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HVAC_Switch = 0

HVAC_Loads = HVAC_Switch*Typical_Residential_Consumption*Percent_HVAC/100

HVAC_Efficiency_Improvement = 31.0

HVAC_Effic = HVAC_Loads*HVAC_Efficiency_Improvement/100

HVAC_Cost_Per_House_Per_Yr = 516.66

Hour_of_the_Day = MOD(TIME,24)

Fuel_Adjustment = 0.01723

Fixed_Cost_Adjustment_Calculation = Fixed_Cost_Adjustment*(LOOKUP(LD.Residential_%,INT(TIME/720))/100)

Fixed_Cost_Adjustment = 2.0E+5

FIT_Rider = .0055

FIT_Recovery_Switch = 0

Efficiency_Switch = 0

Efficiency_Control = STEP(Efficiency_Switch,Effic_Delay*8640)

Effic_Payback = IF(Customer_Costs_for_Effic<=0) THEN 1 ELSE (Accum_Effic_Savings/Customer_Costs_for_Effic)

Effic_Delay = 0

DG_Switch = 0

Determine_Season = (IF (1<=Month) AND (Month<=3) THEN LOOKUP(Jan_Hourly_Demand_Curve,MOD(TIME,720)) ELSE IF
(4<=Month) AND (Month<=5) THEN LOOKUP(April_Hourly_Demand_Curve,MOD(TIME,720)) ELSE IF (6<=Month) AND
(Month<=8) THEN LOOKUP(June_Hourly_Demand_Curve,MOD(TIME,720)) ELSE IF (9<=Month) AND (Month<=11) THEN
LOOKUP(October_Hourly_Demand_Curve,MOD(TIME,720)) ELSE LOOKUP(Jan_Hourly_Demand_Curve,MOD(TIME,720)))*
kwperMW

Customer_Consumption_Data = Typical_Residential_Consumption-Efficiency_Load_Reduction

CP_Price = 0.036
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58.1),
66.6),
68.4),
57.6),
68.8),
76.1),

(4.00,
(13.0,
(22.0,
(31.0,
(40.0,
(49.0,

57.9),
66.0),
65.0),
60.1),
71.2),
75.3),

(5.00,
(14.0,
(23.0,
(32.0,
(41.0,
(50.0,

58.6), (6.00, 60.8), (7.00, 62.7), (8.00,
67.3), (15.0, 66.9), (16.0, 66.8), (17.0,
61.3), (24.0, 57.1), (25.0, 55.0), (26.0,
62.6), (33.0, 64.6), (34.0, 66.6), (35.0,
75.3), (42.0, 83.1), (43.0, 83.1), (44.0,
75.6), (51.0, 76.6), (52.0, 79.8)...

60.7),
71.1),
52.5),
65.8),
84.0),

Normal_Rate_Price = 0.07762

Month = INT((MOD(TIME,8640))/720)+1

Lighting_Effic = Lighting_Loads*Lighting_Efficiency_Improvement/100

Lighting_Switch = 0

Lighting_Loads = Lighting_Switch*Typical_Residential_Consumption*(Avg_Percent_Lighting/100)*
(Pct_Lights_Converted/100)

Lighting_Efficiency_Improvement = 88.0

Lighting_Cost_Per_Watt_Per_Yr = 0.252

kwperMW = 1000

June_Hourly_Demand_Curve = GRAPH(TIME)
(0.00, 71.1), (1.00, 66.7), (2.00, 63.5), (3.00, 62.5), (4.00, 61.6), (5.00, 65.8), (6.00, 71.3), (7.00, 79.5), (8.00, 88.2),
(9.00, 97.1), (10.0, 104), (11.0, 108), (12.0, 106), (13.0, 105), (14.0, 110), (15.0, 110), (16.0, 110), (17.0, 109),
(18.0, 107), (19.0, 102), (20.0, 99.8), (21.0, 101), (22.0, 93.2), (23.0, 85.7), (24.0, 75.7), (25.0, 69.1), (26.0, 66.4),
(27.0, 65.0), (28.0, 64.6), (29.0, 67.9), (30.0, 72.0), (31.0, 78.9), (32.0, 87.7), (33.0, 94.8), (34.0, 102), (35.0, 107),
(36.0, 110), (37.0, 112), (38.0, 113), (39.0, 113), (40.0, 115), (41.0, 112), (42.0, 107), (43.0, 108), (44.0, 104),
(45.0, 105), (46.0, 97.6), (47.0, 87.8), (48.0, 79.7), (49.0, 74.7), (50.0, 70.6), (51.0, 69.1), (52.0, 68.8)...

Jan_Hourly_Demand_Curve = GRAPH(TIME)
(0.00, 60.4), (1.00, 59.4), (2.00, 58.8), (3.00,
(9.00, 63.5), (10.0, 65.3), (11.0, 67.0), (12.0,
(18.0, 73.7), (19.0, 71.8), (20.0, 70.5), (21.0,
(27.0, 52.0), (28.0, 51.7), (29.0, 55.0), (30.0,
(36.0, 67.6), (37.0, 69.3), (38.0, 68.1), (39.0,
(45.0, 82.8), (46.0, 81.8), (47.0, 77.1), (48.0,
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(4.00,
(13.0,
(22.0,
(31.0,
(40.0,
(49.0,

57.7),
83.6),
74.1),
59.8),
86.1),
64.3),

(5.00,
(14.0,
(23.0,
(32.0,
(41.0,
(50.0,

62.1), (6.00, 68.2), (7.00, 76.3), (8.00,
83.4), (15.0, 85.2), (16.0, 86.3), (17.0,
68.5), (24.0, 62.0), (25.0, 58.8), (26.0,
61.2), (33.0, 67.2), (34.0, 70.8), (35.0,
87.8), (42.0, 86.9), (43.0, 90.7), (44.0,
61.6), (51.0, 60.1), (52.0, 60.6)...

79.4),
84.5),
56.1),
73.8),
90.1),

Residential_Customers = 17000

Regulatory_Review_Metric = ((CE.Past_Annual_Sales-UE.Past_Annual_Cost)/CE.Past_Annual_Sales+1)*100

Regulator_Adjustment = Regulatory_Review_Metric-Allowed_Gross_Profit

PT_Price = 0.031

PT_Schedule = GRAPH(TIME)
(0.00, 0.1), (1.00, 0.1), (2.00, 0.1), (3.00, 0.1), (4.00, 0.1), (5.00, 0.1), (6.00, 0.1), (7.00, 0.1), (8.00, 0.1), (9.00, 0.1),
(10.0, 0.1), (11.0, 0.1), (12.0, 0.1), (13.0, 0.1), (14.0, 0.1), (15.0, 0.1), (16.0, 0.1), (17.0, 0.1), (18.0, 0.1), (19.0, 0.1),
(20.0, 0.1), (21.0, 0.1), (22.0, 0.1), (23.0, 0.1)

Percent_Water_Htr = 20.0

Percent_HVAC = 49.0

Peak_Range_% = 0

PD_Price = 0.18

PD_Schedule = GRAPH(TIME)
(0.00, 0.1), (1.00, 0.1), (2.00, 0.1), (3.00, 0.1), (4.00, 0.1), (5.00, 0.1), (6.00, 0.1), (7.00, 0.1), (8.00, 0.1), (9.00, 0.1),
(10.0, 0.1), (11.0, 0.1), (12.0, 0.1), (13.0, 0.1), (14.0, 0.1), (15.0, 0.1), (16.0, 0.1), (17.0, 0.1), (18.0, 0.1), (19.0, 0.1),
(20.0, 0.1), (21.0, 0.1), (22.0, 0.1), (23.0, 0.1)

Pct_Wind_Adoption = 0

Pct_Solar_Adoption = 0

Pct_Lights_Converted = 100

Pct_CHP_Adoption = 0

October_Hourly_Demand_Curve = GRAPH(TIME)
(0.00, 66.0), (1.00, 63.3), (2.00, 59.3), (3.00, 57.3),
(9.00, 82.4), (10.0, 86.0), (11.0, 87.9), (12.0, 88.1),
(18.0, 82.5), (19.0, 85.8), (20.0, 85.7), (21.0, 81.3),
(27.0, 55.1), (28.0, 53.7), (29.0, 55.7), (30.0, 58.0),
(36.0, 77.9), (37.0, 81.0), (38.0, 83.0), (39.0, 85.7),
(45.0, 85.8), (46.0, 80.5), (47.0, 74.6), (48.0, 68.9),
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Total_DG_Rate = DG_Switch*(CHP_Gen+Solar_Gen+Wind_Gen)

Storage_Capacity_kwh = 25000

Solar_System_Costs = 0.24

Solar_Switch = 0

Solar_Power_Output = GRAPH(TIME)
(0.00, 0.00), (1.00, 0.00), (2.00, 0.00), (3.00, 0.00), (4.00, 0.00), (5.00, 0.00822), (6.00, 8.95), (7.00, 351), (8.00,
981), (9.00, 1577), (10.0, 1988), (11.0, 2221), (12.0, 2209), (13.0, 2156), (14.0, 1879), (15.0, 1373), (16.0, 755),
(17.0, 189), (18.0, 2.21), (19.0, 0.00), (20.0, 0.00), (21.0, 0.00), (22.0, 0.00), (23.0, 0.00)

Solar_Gen = Solar_Switch*(LOOKUP(Solar_Power_Output,MOD(TIME,24))/1000)*Residential_Customers*
(Pct_Solar_Adoption/100)

Solar_FIT = GRAPH(TIME)
(0.00, 0.24), (5.00, 0.24), (10.0, 0.24), (15.0, 0.24), (20.0, 0.24), (25.0, 0.1)

Shifted_Load_Storage_Costs = 17.09

Shifted_Load_Switch = 0

Sales_Trend = Annual_Energy_Sales-Past_Annual_Sales

Roundtrip_Efficiency = 100

Rider = FIT_Recovery_Switch*FIT_Rider

Residential_% = GRAPH(TIME)
(0.00, 35.6), (1.00, 38.5), (2.00, 31.6), (3.00, 29.0), (4.00, 22.4), (5.00, 22.3), (6.00, 23.0), (7.00, 24.9), (8.00, 22.4),
(9.00, 23.1), (10.0, 26.7), (11.0, 32.7)
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GRAPH(TIME)
0.05), (2.00, 0.05), (3.00, 0.05), (4.00, 0.05), (5.00, 0.07), (6.00, 0.07), (7.00, 0.07), (8.00, 0.07),
0.05), (11.0, 0.05), (12.0, 0.05), (13.0, 0.05), (14.0, 0.05), (15.0, 0.05), (16.0, 0.05), (17.0, 0.05),
0.05), (20.0, 0.05), (21.0, 0.05), (22.0, 0.05), (23.0, 0.05)

Wind_Capacity = 10

watts_per_kw = 1000

Water_Htr_Efficiency_Improvement = 59.0

Water_Htr_Cost_Per_House_Per_Yr = 128.0

Utility_Costs_Per_Year_For_Strategies = CP.DG_Switch*(CP.CHP_Switch*((CHP_Install_Cost*
CP.Residential_Customers*(CP.Pct_CHP_Adoption/100))+(CP.CHP_Gen*CHP_System_Operating_Costs))+
(CP.Solar_Switch*Solar_System_Costs*4500*CP.Residential_Customers*(CP.Pct_Solar_Adoption/100))+
(CP.Wind_Switch*Wind_System_Costs*CP.Residential_Customers*(CP.Pct_Wind_Adoption/100)))+
(LD.Shifted_Load_Switch*LD.Storage_Capacity_kwh*Shifted_Load_Storage_Costs)

Utility_Gross_Profit = CE.Annual_Energy_Sales-Annual_Utility_Energy_Costs

Typical_Residential_Consumption = (Determine_Season*(LOOKUP(Residential_%,INT((MOD(TIME,8640))/720))/100))

Trough_Range_% = 15

TOU_Rate_Winter =
(0.00, 0.05), (1.00,
(9.00, 0.07), (10.0,
(18.0, 0.05), (19.0,

TOU_Rate_Off_Season = GRAPH(TIME)
(1.00, 0.05), (1.96, 0.05), (2.91, 0.05), (3.87, 0.05), (4.83, 0.05), (5.78, 0.05), (6.74, 0.05), (7.70, 0.05), (8.65, 0.05),
(9.61, 0.05), (10.6, 0.05), (11.5, 0.05), (12.5, 0.05), (13.4, 0.05), (14.4, 0.05), (15.3, 0.05), (16.3, 0.05), (17.3, 0.05),
(18.2, 0.05), (19.2, 0.05), (20.1, 0.05), (21.1, 0.05), (22.0, 0.05), (23.0, 0.05)

TOU_Switch = 1

TOU_Rate_Summer = GRAPH(TIME)
(0.00, 0.05), (1.00, 0.05), (2.00, 0.05), (3.00, 0.05), (4.00, 0.05), (5.00, 0.05), (6.00, 0.05), (7.00, 0.05), (8.00, 0.05),
(9.00, 0.05), (10.0, 0.05), (11.0, 0.05), (12.0, 0.05), (13.0, 0.25), (14.0, 0.25), (15.0, 0.25), (16.0, 0.25), (17.0, 0.25),
(18.0, 0.25), (19.0, 0.25), (20.0, 0.05), (21.0, 0.05), (22.0, 0.05), (23.0, 0.05)
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Wtr_Htr_Switch = 0

Wtr_Htr_Loads = Wtr_Htr_Switch*Typical_Residential_Consumption*Percent_Water_Htr/100

Wind_System_Costs = 1000.0

Wind_Switch = 0

Wind_Power_Output = GRAPH(TIME)
(0.00, 0.00), (1.00, 0.00), (2.00, 0.00), (3.00, 0.00), (4.00, 0.00), (5.00, 0.00), (6.00, 0.00), (7.00, 0.00), (8.00, 0.00),
(9.00, 60.0), (10.0, 80.0), (11.0, 105), (12.0, 105), (13.0, 130), (14.0, 170), (15.0, 170), (16.0, 170), (17.0, 95.0),
(18.0, 65.0), (19.0, 0.00), (20.0, 0.00), (21.0, 0.00), (22.0, 0.00), (23.0, 0.00)

Wind_Gen = Wind_Switch*(LOOKUP(Wind_Power_Output,MOD(TIME,24))/1000)*Residential_Customers*
(Pct_Wind_Adoption/100)

Wind_FIT = GRAPH(TIME)
(0.00, 0.208), (5.00, 0.208), (10.0, 0.208), (15.0, 0.208), (20.0, 0.208), (25.0, 0.1)
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